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On November 1, 2013, Hilal al Jedda received an order from the
Home Secretary of the United Kingdom, a woman responsible for
overseeing all internal affairs of England and Wales.1 It informed
him that he was no longer considered a citizen of the UK.2 This no
1 Secretary of State for the Home Department, CROWN GOV’T DIGITAL SERV.,
https://www.gov.uk/
government/ministers/secretary-of-state-for-the-homedepartment [https://perma.cc/P4U7-XB4T] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
2 Alice K. Ross, Home Secretary Strips Man of UK Citizenship — For the Second
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doubt came as a shock to Mr. al Jedda, who had, in October 2013—
three weeks prior—won his appeal at the UK Supreme Court from
an identical order revoking his citizenship a first time in 2007 on
the grounds that the revocation would leave him effectively stateless.3 Identified by the Home Secretary as a terrorist threat for allegedly recruiting terrorists and facilitating travel of an identified
terrorist explosives expert into Iraq,4 Mr. al Jedda had already experienced a fair amount of deprivation in the name of counterterrorism. He was detained by British forces in Iraq from 2004–2007,
without charges,5 and tortured, which the European Court of Human Rights found constituted an unlawful deprivation of liberty
and security under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.6 Since 2007, he has lived as an illegal resident of Turkey, making use of a fraudulent Iraqi passport to apply for work
and spending his time engaged in prolonged court battles.7
Mr. al Jedda’s saga may be the most dramatized public display of State citizenship-stripping or revocation laws, but it is not
unique. Since 9/11, developed and developing countries alike
have demonstrated a growing trend towards serious consideration
and passage of citizenship revocation statutes.8 With the growth of
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), these trends have rapidly
exacerbated. ISIS, uniformly designated as a terrorist group by the
UN, U.S., and EU,9 has attracted increasing numbers of young
Time, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/12/02/home-secretary-stripsman-of-uk-citizenship-for-the-second-time [https://perma.cc/32P6-A7UQ].
3 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Al-Jedda, [2013] UKSC 62
(appeal taken from Eng.).
4 Case of Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 2011 Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 11 (2011).
5 To date, Mr. al Jedda has never been charged with a crime under UK domestic law or international law. Id.
6 The Court found that the United Kingdom’s actions constituted a grave
enough breach that lasted for a “very long period of time” and uncustomarily
awarded monetary compensation in the sum of € 25,000. Id. ¶ 114.
7 Ross, supra note 2.
8 See infra Section 2 (describing current international anti-terrorism law).
9 See S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2170 (Aug. 15, 2014) (“The Security
Council . . . [d]eplores and condemns in the strongest terms the terrorist acts of ISIL
and its violent extremist ideology, and its continued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law”)
(emphasis added); S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) (establishing a Committee of the Security Council to oversee the three sanctions
measures imposed by the Security Council and listing ISIL as an entity “associated with” Al-Qaida under the alias Al-Qaida in Iraq); Foreign Terrorist Organiza-

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

1276

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:4

people to join their conquest to restore an Islamic caliphate in the
Middle East.10 The group’s message includes calls for attacks in
the West, the promotion of which has been taken up by the young
disciples now deemed foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) who maintain citizenship in the U.S. or in European countries.11 Faced with
an increasingly dire situation and no modern-day precedent, Western leaders have turned to citizenship-stripping in an attempt to
stem the tide of FTFs.12
The new rhetoric and promotion of citizenship-stripping as a
counter-terror tool is extreme. While citizenship revocation has
always been codified as States’ last right to determine their composition, the use of the practice had reached near single digits following World War II. Used during the Nazi era and interwar years as
tions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
[https://perma.cc/8QLE-CA34] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015) (listing ISIS on the list
of designated foreign terrorist organizations).
10 Alan Cowell & Maia de la Baume, Briton and Frenchman Tentatively Identified in Islamic State Execution Video, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/world/europe/british-and-frenchmilitants-may-have-been-seen-in-isis-execution-video.html
[https://perma.cc/5ZM5-NSX2]; Suzanne Daley & Maia de la Baume, A French
Town Reels After Teenage Girl Vanishes Apparently to Join Jihadists, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/europe/a-french-townreels-after-teenage-girl-vanishes-apparently-to-join-jihadists.html
[https://perma.cc/FQN2-HB8Z].
11 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2249, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2249 (Nov. 20, 2015) (condemning a list of recent attacks); Rukmini Callimachi, ISIS Claims Responsibility,
Calling Paris Attacks ‘First of the Storm,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/isis-claims-responsibilityfor-paris-attacks-calling-them-miracles.html
[https://perma.cc/ACD9-C6GZ]
(describing ISIS taking responsibility for terrorist attacks in Paris and their associated rhetoric); Kareem Fahim, Militants Attack Hotel in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, Killing
at
Least
7,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
24,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/middleeast/egypt-north-sinaicar-bomb-hotel.html [https://perma.cc/CA7N-96V5] (outlining a string of attacks
carried out by ISIS in Egypt). For information related to recent attacks in America
or arrests of ISIS-supporters and whether they were American-born or foreign, see
generally LORENZO VIDINO & SEAMUS HUGHES, ISIS IN AMERICA: FROM RETWEETS TO
RAQQA (Dec. 2015); Sergio Pechanha & K.K. Rebecca Lai, The Origins of JihadistInspired
Attackers
in
the
U.S.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
8,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/25/us/us-muslim-extremiststerrorist-attacks.html [https://perma.cc/QK2Y-EMEX].
12 See infra Section 2 (detailing the current law). Some government officials
would go even further and revoke the citizenship of terrorists’ families. See Jerusalem Mayor: Revoke Citizenship of Terrorists’ Families, HAARETZ, Nov. 21, 2014,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.627759
[https://perma.cc/5G7BV6HT] (Isr.) (outlining Mayor Nir Barkat’s belief in the measure’s necessity in the
fight “against evil people, to locate them and deal with them firmly”).
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a political tool to denaturalize large swaths of populations, States
took a hard line against this practice at the latter half of the twentieth century, with the U.S. in particular adopting the most restrictive test for when a State could rescind citizenship. Now, as the
world has grown more interconnected through use of regulatory
and enforcement bodies like the UN and international legal mechanisms and threats have grown less connected to State practice and
veered sharply towards non-state actors, the question of citizenship’s value—to both the State and the individual—is paramount.
While the opening towards citizenship-stripping may not be
surprising in the current wartime climate,13 it is a change that
should not be accepted lightly. New laws take advantage of extreme power imbalances and evoke issues of fundamental fairness
rarely considered in the course of daily legal practice. Though they
affect a miniscule fraction of people worldwide, the extreme repercussions of revocation for the individual, the country that accepts
such an outcome, and neighboring countries that perceive the deprivation as an acceptable tool make the issue highly problematic
and worthy of international discussion on par with policies like the
death penalty or extraordinary rendition. All are extreme forms of
State power.
This article will address the fundamental problems with citizenship-stripping and argue that the newly-expanded laws in
Western nations should be rescinded in favor of more traditional,
13 The U.S. continues to act under domestic authority given by the Authorization for the Use of Military Force signed on September 18, 2001 to conduct air
strikes in Iraq and Syria. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23,

107th Cong. (2001). The UK voted to authorize airstrikes in Syria on Dec. 2,
2015, after having authorized airstrikes in Iraq in 2014. Steven Erlanger & Stephen Castle, British Jets Hit ISIS in Syria After Parliament Authorizes Airstrikes,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/world/
europe/britain-parliament-syria-airstrikes-vote.html
[https://perma.cc/C7HACFJJ]. France acts under its emergency State powers, and in all cases the basis
for current strikes against ISIS in Syria under international law—that Syria is unable or unwilling to address ISIS’ threat to international security—has come under scrutiny for its legal weight. See Letter Dated 23 September 2014, from the
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations
Addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014) (detailing the United States’ justification for the use of self defense to be Syria’s inability to take action against ISIL); Paul Farrell, Isis Attack on Paris May Be an
‘Act of War’ but Retaliation May Not Be Lawful, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/16/isis-attack-on-paris-may-be-anact-of-war-but-retaliation-might-not-be-lawful
[https://perma.cc/URR7-KF9F]
(recounting French airstrikes against ISIS in Raqqa and questioning the legality
of airstrikes against ISIS since it is not a State).
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temporary wartime measures to impede the spread of terrorism
without severing the bonds of citizenship. Part I will explain the
evolution of expatriation laws—particularly in the U.S.—to
demonstrate the relative narrowing of the use of such laws since
World War II. Part II will outline the current state of citizenshipstripping laws worldwide. Part III will then analyze the legal and
policy implications of a world in which States regularly practice
citizenship-stripping. I conclude that although the new laws may
be legal under the weak citizenship protections of domestic and international law, they are unsound as matters of policy and should
be categorically disfavored. Part IV will outline several alternative
means of restricting alleged terrorists’ rights, including passport
suspension, rehabilitation, and increased data sharing with transportation carriers.14
1. HISTORY OF CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY LAWS IN THE U.S.
AND BEYOND
1.1. The U.S. Example
Notwithstanding a brief debate at the Constitutional Convention to strip dual citizenship from those with titles of nobility,15
14 The basic idea of using tools that are already legally available has been expressed in several op-eds from a variety of Western nations. See, e.g., Editorial,
Canada Should Not Strip People, Even Terrorists, of Citizenship, GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 6,
2013),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/editorials/canadashould-not-strip-people-even-terrorists-of-citizenship/article8305275
[https://perma.cc/NR9T-9DE9] (Can.) (proposing the individuals be apprehended and tried for treason within the domestic court system); Ben Saul, Op-Ed,
Denying Dual Citizenship is a Double-Edged Sword, AUSTRALIAN (June 24, 2014),
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/denying-dualcitizenship-is-a-doubleedged-sword/newsstory/cd624c747e6467fcee8d7662b5204324
[https://perma.cc/QQU7-Q9YJ
]
(Austl.) (suggesting domestic prosecution on charges of terrorism, war crimes,
crimes against humanity or foreign incursion); Clive Stafford Smith, Op-Ed, Two
Nations,
Related
by
Fear,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
13,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/opinion/two-nations-related-byfear.html [https://perma.cc/2TB7-FH2K] (condemning citizenship-stripping as a
threat to “the right to life itself” and praising the alternative efforts as expressions
of the developing human rights climate). This paper will endeavor to take these
ideas, expand on them, and demonstrate their feasibility in a systematic manner.
15 Jol A. Silversmith, The “Missing Thirteenth Amendment”: Constitutional Non-
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questions of citizenship revocation did not materialize in the early
1800s because the initial grant of citizenship was a dividing issue
between state and federal powers. National and state citizenships
existed, but “there was little attempt to eliminate the contradictions” because “any real clarification would have augmented the
North-South schism.”16 A uniform policy of requirements to obtain citizenship would not be defined until the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which assigned the determination to the
national government once and for all.17 The “right to expatriation”
was first granted in 1868.18
Throughout the late 1800s, the U.S. government used expatriation law to deny diplomatic protections to dual citizens who returned to their countries of origin.19 The Expatriation Act of 1907
codified these practices and provided for the loss of citizenship of
individuals who swore allegiance to a foreign sovereign and of
American women who married foreigners.20 Public sentiment at
the time distrusted dual nationals as inherent threats to the country, to the point where President Theodore Roosevelt labeled the
theory of dual nationality “a self-evident absurdity.”21
The 1940 Immigration and Nationality Act further broadsense and Titles of Nobility, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 577, 578–81 (1999).
16 J. ROCHE, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP 26 (1949).
17 Id. See also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (noting that “on three
occasions, in 1794, 1797, and 1818, Congress considered and rejected proposals to
enact laws which would describe certain conduct as resulting in expatriation”).
18 Act of July 27, 1868, Title XXV, Citizenship, 18 Rev. Stat. §§ 1999–2001
(1874). The Supreme Court, in its 1967 ruling finding involuntary citizenship revocation a violation of the 14th Amendment, cited to the early U.S. government’s
repeated unsuccessful attempts to legislate on the “right to expatriation” as evidence that Congress did not have power to revoke citizenship without citizens’
consent. See Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257 (finding “there is nothing in the . . . Fourteenth Amendment to warrant drawing from it a restriction upon the power otherwise possessed by Congress to withdraw citizenship”).
19 Peter J. Spiro, Expatriating Terrorists, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2171 (2014).
20 Act of Mar. 2, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-193, §§ 2–3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228–29 (1907).
21 Theodore Roosevelt, True Americanism, in THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN
AMERICAN MIND: SELECTED WRITINGS 165, 165 (Mario Di Nunzio ed., 1995) (calling
dual citizens “hyphenated Americans”). For more information on the general distrust of dual citizens at the turn of the twentieth century, see Embracing Dual Nationality, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Jan. 1, 1999),
http://carnegieendowment.org/
1999/01/01/embracing-dual-nationality
[https://perma.cc/8AH8-JS6Y] (illustrating the perception of dual citizens as being somehow “antithetical to the traditional conception of the state and its relationship to individuals . . . [one] of indivisible allegiance, which leave[s] little
room for multiple attachments”).
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ened the scope of the government’s powers to expatriate, providing for expatriation on the grounds of service in a foreign armed
force and adding a presumption of denaturalization for residents
living two years in their country of origin or five years in any foreign country any time after naturalization.22 The law did not discriminate between citizenship-stripping that would cause statelessness or that which would only cause loss of dual nationality.23
As citizenship laws developed, the government increasingly came
to use them to denaturalize political dissidents like Communists
and Socialists and to marginalize groups like Asian Americans in
World War II, Asian American sympathizers, and “radicals” during World War I who showed disloyal tendencies.24
By the end of the two World Wars, the U.S. Supreme Court
started reining in the government’s sweeping use of citizenshipstripping in its national security plan. In 1958, the Supreme Court
rejected punitive use of expatriation for army deserters in Trop v.
Dulles.25 In the 1967 decision Afroyim v. Rusk, the Court struck
down foreign voting as a ground of expatriation for a dual national, concluding broadly that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
give Congress the power to involuntarily take away citizenship.26
The Court’s language expressed an ideal of citizenship that rose
above individual rights towards a higher conception of protecNationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 853, §§ 401–10, 54 Stat. 1137, 1170–71
(1940). See also PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 56 (2012) (providing a fuller account of the development of the 1940 law).
23 §§ 401–10, 54 Stat. 1137, 1170–71.
24 Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Not Just Japanese Americans: The Untold Story of U.S.
Repression During ‘The Good War,’ 7 J. HIST. REV., 285 (1986), available at
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v07/v07p285_Hummel.html [https://perma.cc/W6VG7KCN]; Anna O. Law, Weil: The Sovereign Citizen, 12 L. & POL. 621, 621–27 (2013)
(book review).
25 The Court made its position clear: “It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was
centuries in the development.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957). Note that
this was struck down despite the procedural protections instantiated in the 1940
Immigration and Nationality Act, which only allowed for revocation based on desertion after conviction by courts martial or a court of competent jurisdiction “because the penalty [was] so drastic.” U.S. COMM. ON IMMIGR., REVISION AND
CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. NO. 2150, 3
(1940).
26 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967). See also WEIL, supra note 22, at 174 (discussing Justice Black’s belief that the citizenship clause’s text conferred absolute protection of
one’s citizenship as a basic right).
22
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tion.27 Lastly, the 1980 opinion Vance v. Terrazas affirmed the idea
that citizenship, even of a dual national, could not be revoked
without intent to relinquish it.28 Current U.S. law specifies seven
acts that, if performed voluntarily with the intention to relinquish
U.S. nationality, will be grounds for expatriation, including service
in a foreign army engaged in hostilities against the United States
and conviction for an act of treason.29
Although seven acts are still grounds for revocation, the
Court has expressed strong disfavor in allowing revocation above
traditional criminal or civil punishments.30 In 1990, the head of the
Board of Appellate Review, the body that oversaw appeals of citizenship-stripping cases pre-2008, wrote that after two-hundred
years there was now a consensus in government that “an American
citizen, natural born or naturalized, has a constitutional right to
remain a citizen unless he/she voluntarily assents to relinquish citizenship.”31 Indeed, by 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher quipped: “It is no longer possible to terminate [an] American’s citizenship without the citizen’s cooperation. The laws
should be amended to reflect this reality.”32
1.2. Other Western Nations
France, Britain, and Australia have less radical turns to the pro27 Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268 (“Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a cooperative affair. Its citizenry is the country and the country is its citizenry. The very nature of our free government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of
law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another
group of citizens of their citizenship.”).
28 Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 261 (1980) (holding that while acts specified in the 1940 Act may be “highly persuasive evidence” of intent to relinquish
citizenship, the trier of fact must still conclude that an additional specific intent to
relinquish citizenship existed).
29 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82–414, § 349(a), 66
Stat. 163, 267–68 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2012)).
30 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 114 (Brennan, J. concurring) (“it is . . . abundantly clear
that these ends could more fully be achieved by alternative methods not open to
these objections”).
31 Alan G. James, Expatriation in the United States: Precept and Practice Today
and Yesterday, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 853, 855 (1990).
32 LAURIE GROSSMAN & LEON WILDES, EXPATRIATION: OVERVIEW AND SPECIAL
RENUNCIATION
PROBLEMS
7
(1999),
available
at
http://www.wildeslaw.com/images/stories/document_archive/aila_ specialrenunciation.pdf [https://perma.cc/64NS-72E8].
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tection of citizenship in their modern histories, but nonetheless exhibit a similar narrowing of the law post-World War II.
In Britain, citizenship-stripping did not exist until World
War I and had been rejected by Parliament prior to then as a power
too “transcendental” for the government to exercise.33 Used only
infrequently in both World Wars, the laws were narrowed postWorld War II, shedding the provisions that allowed for stripping
of those “not of good character” or “subject of a state at war.”34
The law continued to be used exceedingly sparingly—from 1949–
1973, Britain stripped ten people of citizenship.35 From 1973–2003,
that number decreased to zero.36 Parliamentarians kept the provisions in a re-draft of the 1981 Immigration Act on the thought that
“there should be power in the last resort” to use the law.37 Although the law was not narrowed or curtailed by the courts as
dramatically as in the U.S., in many ways there was no need to.
The British government abided by the philosophy of last resort
even in times of war, national fervors for recrimination against political dissidents, and other changes to the political direction of the
State.
In France citizenship-stripping, or “déchéance,” is codified in
Articles 25 and 26 of the Civil Code.38 Originally designed to strip
citizenship from those who continued to practice slavery after it
was banned in 1848,39 the provision is limited to only those citizens
naturalized within the past ten years and grounds citizenshipstripping on conviction of serious crimes (crimes with a possible
sentence of more than 5 years)40 or engagement in acts on behalf of
33 Matthew Gibney, Deprivation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom: A Brief
History, 28 IMM., ASYLUM & NATIONALITY L. 326, 326–27 (2014).
34 Id. at 329.
35 Shai Lavi, Punishment and the Revocation of Citizenship in the UK, U.S. and
Israel, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 404, 408 (2010).
36 Id.
37 Gibney, supra note 33, at 330 (citing 423 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1981)
423 (U.K.)).
38 CODE CIVIL [C.Civ.] art. 25–26 (Fr.). The provisions were upheld for their
Constitutionality in a 2015 judgment of the Constitutional Court. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC][Constitutional Court] Decision No. 2014 – 439QPC, Jan. 23, 2015
(Fr.) (confirming that citizenship-stripping, at least when used as a response to
acts of terrorism, is a practice in conformity with the French Constitution.).
39 Eugenie Bastie, Déchéance de Nationalité: Que Dit le Droit?, Le Figaro
(Nov.
14,
2015)
(Fr.),
http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualitefrance/2015/01/23/01016-20150123ARTFIG00252-decheance-de-nationalite-quedit-le-droit.php [https://perma.cc/AW4P-YHR7].
40 Id.
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a foreign State that are incompatible with the qualities of the
French and prejudicial to French interests. Article 25 was most notably used under the Vichy regime to strip 15,000 people, 7,000 of
whom were Jews, of their citizenship, along with Frenchmen living
outside the territory of France such as the Gaullists.41 Following
World War II, Article 25 was used infrequently.42 Summing up a
discussion of loss of nationality laws due to offenses against the
State in European countries pre-9/11, one author stressed that
“these modes of withdrawal of nationality seem generally to be of
little relevance in practice in those States, where they have already
been in force for some time.”43
Australia only created independent citizenship from the
U.K. in 1949,44 but until 2007 it had no law on citizenship-stripping
in the sense at issue.45 Even in 2007, the law only allowed for naturalized citizens to be stripped for fraud in the application, for service in a foreign army at war with Australia, or for conviction of a
serious offence (an offence committed before the person became an
Australian citizen for which he/she has been sentenced to death or
a serious prison sentence).46
In sum, the world of nationality laws today is quite different
than the world of even fifty years prior. The U.S. Supreme Court
has made it near impossible to strip citizenship without affirmative
ANNE Simonin, Le déshonneur de la République: une histoire de l'indignité, 1791–1958 175 (2008) (Fr.); Patrick Weil, Speech at the French-American
Foundation
Luncheon
(Apr.
2,
2013),
available
at
https://frenchamerican.org/new-weil-work-explores-us-citizenship-2082013
[https://perma.cc/KZ7V-JYS3]. One of the most oft-quoted quips in academic
circles related to nationality comes from Hannah Arendt’s influential 1951 novel
The Origins of Totalitarianism, in which she made the claim that “one is almost
tempted to measure the degree of totalitarian infection by the extent to which the
concerned governments use their sovereign right of denationalization.” HANNAH
ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 278–79 (1951).
42 See Bastie, supra note 39 (describing 21 cases of stripping since 1989). The
French political mindset had largely abandoned the practice until the rise of ISIS.
See CHRISTOPHE BERTOSSI & ABDELLALI HAJJAT, EUDO CITIZENSHIP OBSERVATORY:
COUNTRY REPORT: FRANCE 24 (2013) (stating that déchéance was used less than
once a year and described as a right of the government for use “in exceptional circumstances.”).
43 Harald Waldrauch, Loss of Nationality, in 1 ACQUISITION AND LOSS OF
NATIONALITY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSES, POLICIES AND TRENDS IN 15 EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES 183, 207 (Rainer Baubock et al., eds., 2006).
44 Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) ss 10–16 (Austl.).
45 Until 2002, citizens would lose their Australian nationality through acquiring another citizenship. Id. s 17 (repealed 2002).
46 Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) s 37 (Austl.).
41
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consent from the individual, and the practice has been legally and
functionally abridged in other Western nations. U.S. law has omitted grounds that disfavored dual nationality as a threat without
additional acts,47 and many other nations post-World War II have
similarly amended their laws so that dual citizens may retain their
original citizenship in places like the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Turkey.48 Some have gone so
far as to argue that dual nationality may morph into its own human right given the broad consensus on its enforceability.49 Senator Johnson, in a 2014 speech at the passage of a Senate Resolution
to bring attention to the injustices of the 1907 Expatriation Act,
summed up this century-long trend in the American context: “U.S.
citizenship means full participation in this incredible experiment in
human freedom that is America. Something so coveted should
never be taken away so frivolously . . . .”50
2. CURRENT COUNTER-TERRORISM LAWS ON CITIZENSHIP
This section will be divided into two sub-parts: laws enacted and laws proposed. As homegrown terror attacks continue to
make headlines, it is those countries that have only had proposed
47 For example, although naturalized citizens are required to take a renunciation oath whose language sounds quite strict, the oath is not enforced. See
RANDALL HANSEN & PATRICK WEIL, DUAL NATIONALITY, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND
FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE: THE REINVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP 25
(2002) (highlighting that those born dual nationals are not required to elect one,
native-born Americans do not lose U.S. citizenship upon acquisition of another
nationality, and no sanctions are brought against those retaining their original nationalities). The Oath of Allegiance text may be found in the Immigration and Nationality Act § 337(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1448.
48 Embracing Dual Nationality, supra note 21. See also Peter J. Spiro, Hofstra
University School of Law, Keynote Address at the Cantigny Conference Series:
Immigration and Citizenship in America: Dual Nationality: Unobjectionable and
Unstoppable
(July,
2000),
available
at
http://cis.org/node/2939
[https://perma.cc/A3VN-9JF5] (arguing that it is “too late for the entrenchment
of dual nationality to be reversed. Dual nationality has become a fact of globalization.”).
49 See generally Peter J. Spiro, Dual Citizenship as Human Right, 8 INT’L J.
CONST’L L. 111 (2010).
50 S. Res. 402, 113th Cong., (2014); Press Release, Al Franken, FrankenJohnson Resolution Passes Senate, Brings Attention to History of Women Stripped
of
Citizenship
&
Voting
Rights
(May
15,
2014),
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2822
[https://perma.cc/H4X5-CDJ3].
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laws whose fall into leniency will be most indicative of a sea
change in the public world order.51 Nation-states in either stage of
legal development present grave risks to the state of worldwide citizenship protection developed pre-2001.
2.1. Enacted Laws
2.1.1. The UK
As highlighted in the introduction, the U.K. currently has the
most lenient citizenship-revocation laws, and it has used them with
zeal. In al-Jedda, under section 40 of the British Nationality Act of
1981, as amended by the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act
of 2006, citizenship can be removed a) from those who had acquired it fraudulently; or b) “where the Secretary of State is satisfied that the person has done something seriously prejudicial to the
vital interests of the U.K., provided, as is made clear by section
40(4), that revocation of citizenship would not render him stateless.”52
Although these restrictions may apply to nationals by birth or
by naturalization, they have in practice solely been used against
naturalized citizens, creating a discriminating policy of expatriation.53 After the Supreme Court’s first ruling in al-Jedda protecting
him from denaturalization on the basis of potential statelessness,
the Home Secretary sought to amend section 40 to strip away this
protection.54 Lords in Parliament rejected the proposal as “an affront to civilised international relations,”55 but an amended version
51 This has already happened in the year since this article was initially drafted. Additional proposed laws will almost certainly be enacted between the time
of editing and publication, underscoring the steepness of this trend.
52 British Nationality Act, 1981, c. 61 § 40 (U.K.) (as amended by the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, 2002, c. 41, c. 13; Nationality Act, 2014, c. 22).
53 Id.; Helena Wray, The New Powers of Deprivation of Citizenship in the UK,
EUDO CITIZENSHIP (June 28, 2014), http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenshipnews/1160-the-new-powers-of-deprivation-of-citizenship-in-the-uk
[https://perma.cc/GR46-BJNF].
54 Shaheed Fatima, Statelessness Knocked on the Head: House of Lords’ Defeat for
the UK Government’s Citizenship-Stripping Proposal, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 18, 2014),
http://justsecurity.org/9511/uk-governments-citizenship-stripping-proposal
[https://perma.cc/ML56-MEJF].
55 12 May 2014, Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) (2014) 1643 (U.K.), available at
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passed on May 14, 2014. The new law requires the Secretary of
State to have “reasonable grounds for believing that the person is
able, under the law of a country or territory outside the United
Kingdom, to become a national of such a country or territory.” 56
This language gives significant discretion to the Home Secretary to
determine the definition of “reasonableness.” In addition, in cases
seeking to revoke citizenship of dual nationals, the Secretary need
only believe it to be “conducive to the public good.”57 This language is identical to the language in the Immigration Bill that allows the Minister to invoke deportation proceedings, infusing revocation with a sense of gravitas well below its recognized status as
an extraordinary diplomatic tool.58 To date, only al Jedda’s case, of
the fifteen known appeals under the 2006 law, was found unlawful,59 and since the law’s 2014 amendment, all revocations have
been upheld.
From 2003–2012, Britain revoked the citizenship of twentyseven people,60 and in the year 2013 alone Britain stripped another
twenty people of their citizenship on national security grounds.61
http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/1405120001.htm [https://perma.cc/NXA5-PTXH] (being stated by Lord Macdonald of
River Glaven).
56 Immigration Act, 2014, c. 22, § 66 (U.K.)
57 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, 2006, c. 13, § 56 (U.K.). See Ian
Cobain, Home Office Stripping More Dual-Nationality Britons of Citizenship,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
15,
2011),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/15/home-office-law-dualcitizenship [https://perma.cc/VNQ3-NGUJ] (describing the origins of this test).
58 Immigration Act, 1971, c. 77 § I(5)(b) (U.K.). See Lavi, supra note 35, at 408
(explaining this leveling of citizenship-stripping with other immigration procedures as evidence of the switch from citizenship as a “traditional notion of allegiance to a new paradigm of risk management”).
59 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Al-Jedda, [2013] UKSC 62
(appeal taken from Eng.). See Katrin Bennhold, Britain Expands Power to Strip Citizenship
From
Terrorism
Suspects,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
14,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/world/europe/britain-broadens-powerto-strip-terrorism-suspects-of-citizenship.html
[https://perma.cc/T4NB-2UYJ]
(highlighting a 2014 British law that allows the government to revoke the citizenship of terror suspects even when they are not dual citizens, rendering such persons stateless).
60 Victoria Parsons, Citizenship Revoked: What Do We Know About CitizenshipStripping?, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/12/10/what-do
-we-know-about-citizenship-stripping [https://perma.cc/S2SB-777L].
These
numbers do not include citizenship revocation on grounds of fraudulent application.
61 Id.
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Britain’s fervent use of the revocation power and continued expansion of the law’s leniency are the most egregious examples of the
reversal of the 20th century development of citizenship-stripping
as a final resort.
2.1.2. Canada, Israel, and Australia
Several other Western nations, like Canada and Israel, have
adopted more lenient citizenship-stripping provisions since ISIS’s
rise to prominence.62 Canada passed Bill C-24, or the “Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act,” on June 16, 201463 to update its citizenship law for the first time in thirty years.64 The new law, according to the Parliament’s summation, establishes a “hybrid
model for revoking a person’s citizenship in which the Minister
will decide the majority of cases and the Federal Court will decide
the cases related to inadmissibility based on security grounds,”
wherein dual citizens who “engaged in certain acts contrary to the
national interest of Canada” may be permanently barred from reacquiring citizenship.65 The law has already been constitutionally
upheld in Rocco Galati v. David Johnston, wherein the Federal Court
stated “legislative and judicial responses . . . cast considerable
doubt on the concept of a perpetual bond between the subject and
sovereign as a common law principle, let alone one with a constitutional dimension.”66 However, in a notable sign of dissension
within the government as to the legality or propriety of citizenshipstripping, the government in November 2015 suspended proceedings in two citizenship-stripping cases and declared it would conduct an “urgent review” of the “policy and legislation” related to
62 For other Western nations with proposed but not enacted revocation laws,
see infra Section 2.2.1-2.
63 Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-24 (Can.).
64 The law will amend Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29 (Can.).
65 Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-24 (Can.).
66 Galati v. Canada (Governor General), [2015] FC 91, [2015] 4 F.C.R. 3, ¶ 79.
This case has been appealed, and additional civil liberties groups are filing separate constitutional complaints. See Michelle Mcquigge, Citizenship Law Bill C-24
Challenged as Unconstitutional by Civil Rights Groups, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/citizenship-law-bill-c-24challenged-as-unconstitutional-by-civil-rights-groups/article26032727
[https://perma.cc/6HBZ-X3EW] (Can.) (detailing the British Columbia Liberties
Association’s and the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers’ claims that Bill
C-24 violates the Charter of Rights and Freedoms).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

1288

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:4

the provisions.67
Israel has allowed for citizenship revocation based on harm to
State security since its founding, but it only exercised its powers
for the first time in 2002.68 In 2010 a proposed amendment to the
Citizenship Law of 1952 would have required all non-Jews seeking
citizenship to declare an oath of loyalty to the State, and would
have allowed for the breach of such an allegiance by act of terrorism, treason, or acquiring citizenship in an enemy State or permanent residency in an enemy land to constitute grounds for revocation.69 Parts of that law passed in 2011 allow Israeli judges to deny
citizenship to anyone convicted of espionage or committing violence with nationalist motives.70 In November 2014, a bill was
proposed in the Knesset to revoke citizenship of Israeli Arab terrorists and their families,71 and since the Paris attacks of November
67 Glen McGregor, Court Told to Freeze Citizenship Revocations in Terror Cases,
OTTAWA CITIZEN (Nov. 16, 2015), http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/
government-asks-court-to-freeze-proceedings-in-citizenship-cases-while-itrevises-rules-for-revokation [https://perma.cc/Z2BY-75FB] (Can.).
68 Jonathan Steele, Israel to Strip First Arabs of Citizenship, GUARDIAN (Aug. 6,
2002),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/aug/07/israel
[https://perma.cc/KP2H-QT9V]. The Israeli Supreme Court is dealing with the
effects of a 2006 expatriation now. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel
(ACRI) challenged the revocation of four Arabs’ permanent residency statuses because they had accepted positions in Hamas’s newly formed Parliament and
therefore were serving as key members of a group committed to the destruction of
the country. Shimon Cohen & Tova Dvorin, High Court to Decide if Hamas Terrorists
Can
Be
Deported,
ARUTZ
SHEVA
(Dec.
9,
2014),
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/188417#.VIisOofEbTZ
[https://perma.cc/527B-N2XC] (Isr.). The ACRI challenged on the grounds that
the four men have no other citizenship and were not themselves engaged in
known terrorist action. Ari Soffer, High Court ‘Trying to Avoid Expelling Hamas
Terrorists’, ARUTZ SHEVA, (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/
News/News.aspx/188447#.VIisW4fEbTY [https://perma.cc/F8YP-QFTA] (Isr.).
69 Lavi, supra note 35, at 405; ABDALAH: THE LEGAL CTR. FOR ARAB MINORITY
RIGHTS IN ISR., NEW DISCRIMINATORY LAWS AND BILLS IN ISRAEL 4 (Nov. 29, 2010),
available
at
http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/English/Legal_Advocac
y/Discriminatory_Laws/Discriminatory-Laws-in-Israel-October-2012-Update.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5JL7-FRNY] [Isr.].
70 Allyn Fisher-Ilan, Israel Eases Steps to Revoke Citizenship, REUTERS (Mar. 28,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/28/us-israel-parliament-arabsidUSTRE72R6OH20110328 [https://perma.cc/2PNA-2PUN] (describing the passage of the Fighting Terrorism Bill).
71 Harkov Lahav, New Bill Seeks to Revoke Citizenship of Terrorists and Their
Families, JERUSALEM POST (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/IsraelNews/New-bill-seeks-to-revoke-citizenship-of-terrorists-and-their-families380988 [https://perma.cc/38UQ-D2FA] (Isr.).
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2015 the Israeli Prime Minister has asked the attorney general to
allow the government to rescind citizenship of anyone who joins
the Islamic State.72
Australia wrestled with amending its citizenship laws since
January 2014,73 ultimately passing into law a provision to revoke
citizenship from dual nationals in December 2015.74 In an attempt
to demonstrate procedural fairness and transparency, the law requires the government to report the number of individuals
stripped of their citizenship every six months, and the law will be
reviewed in full by the National Security Legislation Monitor no
later than the end of 2018.75
2.1.3. Non-Western Countries
One apparent effect of new revocation laws is that nonWestern countries, particularly the Gulf States, have taken cues
from Western allies that citizenship-stripping is an acceptable
means of promoting national security. As such, they have been using citizenship-stripping provisions in the name of State security to
oust political rivals and those who threaten ruling parties. In 2012,
Bahrain used its 1963 Citizenship Law to strip the citizenship of
thirty-one individuals for allegedly damaging State security.76
Carol J. Williams, Join a Terrorist Group, Lose Your Citizenship, L.A. TIMES
(Nov.
24,
2015),
http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-militantssecurity-citizenship-20151124-story.html [https://perma.cc/T7AV-7P4Z].
73 Katharine Murphy, Australians Fighting in Syria Could Lose Citizenship, Scott
Morrison
Signals,
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
20,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/20/australians-fighting-in-syria
-could-lose-citizenship-say-scott-morrison [https://perma.cc/9ABH-5R7H].
74 Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015
(Cth) sch 1 (Austl.).
75 Id.; Shalailah Medhora, Law to Strip Dual Nationals of Australian Citizenship
Set
to
Pass
Parliament,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
10,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/nov/10/law-to-strip-dualnationals-of-australian-citizenship-set-to-pass-parliament
[https://perma.cc/8TN6-J59Y].
76 Bahraini Citizenship Act of 1963 (last amended 1981); Bahrain: Citizenship
Rights
Stripped
Away,
HUMAN
RTS.
WATCH
(Aug.
21,
2014),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/21/bahrain-citizenship-rights-strippedaway [https://perma.cc/GJ3Z-ZTB2]. There were severe procedural issues with
the decision as well. Appeals, which were permitted under law, could not be
made because the individuals’ names had been removed from the national registry, meaning they had no legal status and “could not give power of attorney to
lawyers to lodge appeals on their behalf.” Id.
72
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Most were active members of protest movements.77 Bahrain further amended the 1963 law in July 2014 to grant the Interior Ministry power to revoke citizenship of people who fail in their “duty of
loyalty” to the State, presumably opening the law up to greater
abuse.78 In August 2014, Bahrain again stripped nine Shi’a citizens
of their citizenship, which the largest Shi’ite political party called
“an unacceptable violation of fundamental human rights.”79
Kuwait similarly revoked the citizenship of fifteen people in
August 2014.80 Though the country would not release reasons for
its decision, the revocations were against political dissidents and
individuals allegedly connected to terrorist financing.81 A local
lawyer, in response to the government’s actions, noted that the
idea of revoking citizenship for political basis or otherwise was an
act “extremely alien to [the Kuwaiti] community.”82 Saudi Arabia
announced in August 2014 it would also consider using citizenship-stripping for security reasons, reviving laws on the books that
historically have been “rare.”83

Id.
Id.
79 Alex MacDonald, Bahrain Strips Nine Nationals of Citizenship for Alleged Iran
Ties,
MIDDLE
E.
EYE
(Aug.
7,
2014),
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/bahrain-strips-nine-nationals-citizenship466606651 [https://perma.cc/V4U3-QP4H].
80 Associated Press, Kuwait Strips 10 People, Top Preacher of Citizenship, DAILY
STAR
(Aug.
11,
2014),
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/MiddleEast/2014/Aug-11/266834-kuwait-strips-10-people-top
-cleric-of-citizenship.ashx [https://perma.cc/8PZX-TB9F] (Leb.).
81 Id.
82 Dahlia Kholaif, Kuwait Strips Dissidents’ Citizenship, AL JAZEERA (Jul. 22,
2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/kuwait-stripsdissidents-citizenship-20147221120375
25983.html
[https://perma.cc/2FSMTAT4].
83 Saudi Arabia Considers Revoking Citizenships, GULF NEWS (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://gulfnews.com/news/
gulf/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-considersrevoking-citizenships-1.1373339 [https://perma.cc/UAG8-58XW]. See also Jane
Kinnimont, Citizenship in the Gulf, in THE GULF STATES AND THE ARAB UPRISINGS 47,
53–54 (Ana Echague ed., 2013) (for a general overview of Gulf States’ forays into
citizenship-stripping).
77
78
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2.2. Proposed Laws
2.2.1. The U.S.
Since 2001, several bill proposals have been floated through
the Senate, with respective counterparts in the House, on the issue
of citizenship-stripping. They have all died in committee or before
referral. A 2003 draft proposal of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act, or the “Patriot II Act,” would have made serving in or
providing material support to a terrorist organization “prima facie
evidence that the act was done with the intention of relinquishing
United States nationality.”84
In 2010, Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced the Terrorist Expatriation Act, which proposed to add new grounds of expatriating
conduct to the Immigration and Nationality Act for providing material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations, engaging in or materially supporting hostilities against the United States,
or engaging in or materially supporting hostilities against any
country supporting the United States in hostilities.85 It was reintroduced without the material support provisions in the 2012 session of Congress as well.86 In 2014, Senator Ted Cruz introduced a
new bill alongside parallel legislation by Representative Bachmann
in the House particularly aimed at defectors to the Islamic State,87
since reintroduced in 2015.88 Similar to the Patriot II Act, the bill
would have determined that joining the Islamic State, or giving
“material assistance” to terrorist organizations,89 provided prima
84 Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 § 501 (as drafted, Jan. 9, 2003),
available
at
http://www-tc.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3HVG-ZUWK] [hereinafter Patriot II].
85 Terrorist Expatriation Act, S. 3327, 111th Cong. (2010).
86 Enemy Expatriation Act, S. 1698, 112th Cong. (2011).
87 Expatriate Terrorists Act, S. 2779, 113th Cong. (2014); Terrorist Denaturalization and Passport Revocation Act, H.R. 5408, 113th Cong. (2014); David Sherfinski, Dems Block Cruz Bill to Strip U.S. Citizenship from Islamic State Defectors, WASH.
TIMES
(Sept.
18,
2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2014/sep/18/dems-block-cruz-strip-citizenship-isis-defectors
[http://perma.cc/5L8K-626Y].
88 Expatriate Terrorist Act, H.R. 503, 114th Cong. (2015).
89 This standard has been challenged by civil liberties groups for its over-
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facie evidence of intent to relinquish citizenship to conform with
the requirement of voluntary renunciation set forth in Vance v. Terrazas.90
Academics posit that “there has been a bipartisan rejection of
proposals to strip terrorists of their U.S. citizenship” and have
surmised that the prospect of citizenship-stripping proposals will
be left for academic inquiry rather than serious future consideration in echelons of U.S. government.91 Yet the possibility of the
U.S. joining the bandwagon of the majority of Western nations’
more lenient citizenship-stripping legislation is not a moot point.
First, the underlying concerns that led to the initial discussions of
expatriation law revision under Patriot II remain valid and highlight unsolved gaps in the existing legal framework. As Section
501 of the Patriot II Act stated: “The current expatriation statute
does not . . . provide for the relinquishing of citizenship in cases
where an American serves in a hostile foreign terrorist organization. It thus fails to take account of the myriad ways in which, in
the modern world, war can be waged against the United States.”92
Just as with larger questions in international law, such as how
to wage war with a non-state actor inhabiting a sovereign State’s
territory,93 there are serious questions that surround how to transplant current U.S. law modeled on citizens acting inside the State
inclusiveness. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Carter Center, Christian Peacemaker
Teams, et al. in Support of Humanitarian law Project, et al. at 6, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (advocating that the broad definition of “material support” in § 2339B to include “service,” “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” or “personnel” infringes on First Amendment protection); Brief for
Academic Researchers & the Citizen Media Law Project as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents/Cross-Petitioners at 8, Holder, 561 U.S. 1 (recommending
that the Court read the material support statute narrowly, requiring “a specific
intent to further an unlawful end” as well as “a likelihood of harm”); Brief of
Amici Curiae Victims of the McCarthy Era in Support of Humanitarian Law Project, et al. at 14–22, Holder, 561 U.S. 1 (analogizing the AEDPA material support
provision to unconstitutional McCarthy era Guilt by Association statutes).
90 Expatriate Terrorists Act, S. 2279, 113th Cong (2014). Cruz asked “[W]ould
any reasonable person want an American who is right now in Iraq . . . who is right
now beheading children . . . —would anyone of good conscience in either party
want that person to be able to come back and land in LaGuardia airport with a
U.S. passport and walk unmolested onto our streets?” Sherfinski, supra note 87.
91 Spiro, supra note 19, at 2187 (“[T]he broader lesson is that citizenship is not
much of a battleground any longer, reflecting its declining salience. The expatriation proposal proved little more than a political blip.”).
92 Patriot II, supra note 84, § 501.
93 See supra note 13 (explaining how nation-states have addressed this dilemma to expand air strikes).
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system, to the realities of modern warfare. This helps to explain
why, as the recent bill of January 2015 demonstrates, there remains
a serious contingent of legislators and presidential front-runners
who are seriously interested in citizenship-stripping expansion.
Optically, citizenship-stripping has played a part in how the government considers U.S. counter-terrorism strategy for a decade.94
Second, the language used in the Senate focused not on the excessiveness of the proposal but on the need to have a longer-term
discussion on the means of restricting constitutional liberties that
did not accompany the introduction of Senator Cruz’s bill. As the
Democratic Senator from Hawaii stated in asking for the bill to be
directed to the Senate Judiciary Committee, “fundamental constitutional rights . . . should be given the full deliberation of the Senate.”95 The public world order will likewise mandate that the U.S.
engage with and respond to its foreign counterparts who have undertaken such legislative changes, thus reinforcing the need for
American debate and consensus on the topic.
2.2.2. Other Western Countries
Former President of France Nicolas Sarkozy as early as 2010
made speeches threatening stripping foreign-born criminals of
their French nationality if they used violence against police or public officials in the wake of violent street protests.96 Since the Paris
94 See H.R. Res. 1288, 111th Cong. (2010) (describing Congressman Charles
Dent’s proposed resolution in 2010 to strip Al-Aulaqi, the radical cleric born in
New Mexico and later killed in a drone strike in Yemen, of citizenship). See also
Eric Lichtblau, U.S., Bowing to Court, to Free ‘Enemy Combatant,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
23,
2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/23/politics/23hamdi.html
[https://perma.cc/FB4M-E7ZL] (detailing how, at Guantanamo, Yaser Hamdi,
who was released on a plea deal to Saudi Arabia in 2004, is claimed to have voluntarily renounced his U.S. citizenship as part of the deal).
95 Sherfinski, supra note 87.
96 Associated Free Press, Sarkozy Looks to Strip Citizenship from Those who
Threaten Police, FR. 24 (July 31, 2010), http://www.france24.com/en/20100730sarkozy-looks-strip-citizenship-threaten-security-forces-french-immigration
[https://perma.cc/WQ7M-W55U].
See also MATTHEW J. GIBNEY, SHOULD
CITIZENSHIP BE CONDITIONAL? DENATIONALISATION AND LIBERAL PRINCIPLES 5 (Refugee Studs. Centre, Working Paper No. 75, 2011), available at
http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/working-paper-series/wp75should-citizenship-be-conditional-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WQ7M-W55U]
(detailing how France’s Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux proposed adding polygamy and genital mutilation to the list of proposed grounds for citizenship loss).
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attacks, France has proposed a constitutional amendment to strip
French-born dual nationals convicted of terrorism of their citizenship,97 a proposal that polls show is widely supported by the
French public.98 France stripped eight citizens between 2001–2014
and in 2015 upped the tally by six more citizens.99 Russian legislators have made similar statements in the wake of the Paris attacks.100 The Austrian Minister of the Interior advocated for a proposal to expatriate “persons participating in armed conflicts in a
foreign armed group” for either dual nationals or, potentially, nationals with only Austrian citizenship, in the summer of 2014.101
Notably, Scandinavian and northern European countries that
have relatively large swaths of their Muslim populations traveling
to the Middle East to join ISIS have seen more hard line approaches
to enforcement, including citizenship-stripping. Norway announced plans to consider revoking citizenship from citizens who
joined ISIS in August 2014.102 Denmark, which has the secondhighest number of foreign fighters to Syria as measured by total
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 25-1 (Fr.); David Revault d’Allonnes, Reforme Constitutionelle: Holland Maintient L’Extension de la Decheance de Nationalite, LE MONDE
(Dec. 23, 2015), http://www. lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/12/23/reformeconstitutionnelle-francois-hollande-maintient-la-decheance-denationalite_4837002_823448.html [https://perma.cc/UBJ4-TDAV] (Fr.). This proposal was tabled in late March 2016. See Adam Nossiter, Francois Hollande Cancels
Plan to Strip French Citizenship in Terrorism Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/31/world/europe/francois-hollande-francecitizenship-terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/6VAM-4F72].
98 9 Out of 10 French Support Stripping Bi-Nationals of Citizenship, RADIO FR.
INTERNATIONALE (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.english.rfi.fr/general/20151230-9out-10-french-support-stripping-bi-nationals-citizenship
[https://perma.cc/5G4N-Z8B6] (Fr.).
99 Mathilde Golla, Cinq Terroristes Bientot Dechus de la Nationalite Francaise,
FIGARO
(Oct.
7,
2015),
http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualitefrance/2015/10/06/01016-20151006ARTFIG00401-cinq-terroristes-bientotdechus-de-la-nationalite-francaise.php [https://perma.cc/627K-3BDG] (Fr.).
100 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 72 (reporting that Federation Council member Konstantin Kosachev said that “there should be taken a decision to cancel operation of their [Russian citizens aiding terrorists] travel passports in order to, as
much as possible, limit the freedom of their movement and enhance chances on
quick arrest”).
101 Gerd Valchars, Austrian Ministers Propose to Denaturalize Austrian Nationals
Fighting in Syria, EUDO CITIZENSHIP (May 6, 2014), http://eudocitizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/1133-austrian-ministers-propose-todenaturalize-austrian-nationals-fighting-in-syria [http://perma.cc/49T9-LUWL].
102 Gianluca Mezzofiore, Norway ‘to Make Citizens Fighting for Isis Stateless’,
INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/norway-makecitizens-fighting-isis-stateless-1462776 [http://perma.cc/U4B2-UZYA].
97
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population,103 has attempted to revoke citizenship three times in its
history—all of which have occurred post-2011. Denmark had its
first successful revocation in July 2015.104 The Netherlands, which
already has a nationality law that allows for citizenship revocation
following conviction of an “offence against the security of the
Kingdom,”105 has considered amendments to allow the government to revoke nationality “in the interests of national security” or
upon “convict[ion] of a terrorist offence.”106
The flurry of activity related to expatriation as a desirable
means of weakening the FTF threat denotes a clear and present
shift in global counter-terrorism policies. The advancement of lenient expatriation legislation supports the need to closely examine
legal and policy justifications for expatriation to fully understand
its effects.
3. WHAT RIGHTS DOES EXPATRIATION AFFECT?
Many academics have written on the declining protections of
citizenship vis-à-vis other legal statuses in the U.S. context, arguing
that one reason citizenship-stripping should not be favored is its
inability to meaningfully restrict individuals’ rights. As this sec103 More
Scandinavians
Joining
Isis,
LOCAL
(Sept.
24,
2014),
http://www.thelocal.dk/20140924/new-fears-of-scandinavians-joining-islamicstate [https://perma.cc/H2JD-D9GL] (Den.).
104
See Christian Wenande, Bookseller From Brønshøj’ Stripped of His Danish
Citizenship,
COPENHAGEN
POST
(July.
1,
2015),
http://cphpost.dk/news/bookseller-from-bronshoj-stripped-of-his-danishcitizenship.html [https://perma.cc/2WTF-7L37] (Den.) (describing the conviction
of a Danish citizen on charges of terrorism and his eventual loss of citizenship).
105 Netherlands Nationality Act (2010), arts. 9(2), 14(1) (Olivier Vonk trans.),
available
at
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/
NationalDB/docs/NL%20Netherlands%20Nationality%20Act%20(consolidated%20201
0,%20English).pdf [https://perma.cc/5JES-CBFT];
Losing Dutch Nationality,
GOV’T OF NETH., available at https://www.government.nl/topics/dutchnationality/contents/loss-of-dutch-nationality [https://perma.cc/Y2DC-DVE7]
(last accessed Jan. 15, 2015).
106 Press Release, Nat’l Coordinator for Sec. and Counterterrorism at Ministry
of Sec. and Justice of Neth., The threat level remains ‘substantial’ (June 30, 2015),
available at https://english.nctv.nl/currenttopics/press_releases/2015/threatlevel-for-the-netherlands-remains-substantial.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LNW6Q9E7]. See also Betty de Hart & Ashley Terlouw, Born Here: Revocation and the Automatic Loss of Dutch Nationality in Case of Terrorist Activities, in EQUALITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: NOTHING BUT TROUBLE? 305, 305–06 (M. van den Brink et al, ed.,
2015) (detailing earlier Dutch proposals to expatriate citizenships).
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tion will demonstrate, those arguments come to the correct conclusion but from the wrong direction. Citizenship-stripping deprives
individuals of meaningful rights, largely in the space of social liberties and procedural protections, but it does not restrict the practices that cause terrorism or potential attacks on U.S. persons at
home or abroad.
Professors Peter Spiro and Peter Schuck both have advanced
similar theories that apart from voting in national elections and the
freedom of unrestricted foreign travel, U.S. citizenship affords few
additional rights.107 They might add recent revelations in the media of wiretapping and surveillance of U.S. citizens in violation of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Fourth Amendment108 and the drone attack that killed U.S. citizen Anwar alAulaqi as evidence that the protections formerly afforded citizens
have eroded in wartime.109
Yet the package of citizenship in reality affords many additional rights. In both wartime examples given, U.S. citizens enjoy
heightened standards of review before the government may decide
to wiretap or engage in an unmanned aerial attack.110 The al107 See Peter Schuck, Citizen Terrorist, 164 POL’Y REV. 61, 72–73 (2011) (demonstrating that the threat of denationalization is not a significant deterrent from terrorist activities). See generally Peter J. Spiro, The (Dwindling) Right and Obligations
of Citizenship, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 899 (2013).
108 Letter from Kathleen Turner, Dir. of Legislative Affairs at the Office of the
Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence to Sen. Ron Wyden (July 20, 2012), available at
www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2012/07/2012-07-20-OLA-Ltr-toSenator-Wyden-ref-Declassification-Request.pdf [https://perma.cc/C55G-VPSX]
(admitting that “on at least one occasion the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court held that some collection carried out pursuant to the Section 702 minimization procedures [for collection of U.S. data] used by the government was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”).
109 See Memorandum from David Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. for Office of Legal Counsel on Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Answar al-Aulaqi to the
Att’y
Gen.
21–22
(July
16,
2010),
available
at
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2014-06-23_barronmemorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX9R-97WK] [hereinafter “Al-Aulaqi
Memorandum”] (outlining the legal justification for the 2011 killing of U.S. citizen
Anwar al-Aulaqi in Yemen).
110 See id. at 21–23 (referencing the scope of AUMF in authorizing lethal force
used against United States citizens in appropriate circumstances); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1879 Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (requiring a court order for intelligence surveillance of U.S. persons, and putting
greater limitations on storage of surveillance of U.S. persons and domestic calls
and required minimization procedures). For a more detailed explanation of the
law, see FISA Amendments Act of 2008 Section 702 Summary Document, O FFICE
OF.
GEN.
COUNS.,
(Dec.
23,
2008),
available
at
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Aulaqi story has been further categorized by CIA Director John O.
Brennan as a “last resort” taken “when there is no alternative,” and
the government has made it clear that the preferred means of combating U.S. citizens who commit acts of terrorism is by capture rather than by killing.111
The harbinger of wartime’s erosion of civil liberties is not new.
From aggressive expansion of material support laws112 to proliferation of the States secrets privilege113 to indefinite detention at
Guantanamo,114 war’s frenzied fear of enemy threats infuses much
of American law.115 However, if we believe that these expansions
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fisa-amendments-act-of-2008section-702-summary-document/1141/ [https://perma.cc/33YN-LY78]. Critics
may point to the sixteen-hour interrogation of U.S. naturalized citizen Dzhokar
Tsarnaev under the public safety exception as an example of Fourth Amendment
erosions for citizens, but the sixteen-hour exception is incomparable to the nearly
seventy day interrogation of non-U.S. citizen Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame
aboard a U.S. military vessel. DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON
TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 241–65 (2011).
111 Nomination of John O. Brennan to Be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 56 (Feb. 7, 2013)
(testimony of John O. Brennan). See also Kirstin Roberts, How Many Americans Are
on
the
Kill
List?
Zero.,
WIRE
(Mar.
20,
2013),
http://www.thewire.com/politics/2013/03/how-many-americans-are-kill-listzero/63369/ [https://perma.cc/ER2K-YURC] (noting the remarks of the House
Intelligence Chairman that there are currently no Americans on the kill list and
that al-Aulaqi was “unique among homegrown terrorists”).
112 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010) (upholding
the constitutionality of the material-support statute); Adam Liptak, Civil Liberties
Today,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
7,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/us/sept-11-reckoning/civil.html
[http://perma.cc/Q3N2-6UWF] (noting that after the September 11th attacks, existing material support statutes were used significantly more, charging more than
100 people in the 5 years following the attacks).
113 See, e.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537–39 (E.D. Va. 2006)
(dismissing a case asserting extraordinary rendition on the grounds that the disclosure of related information would be absolutely protect by the United States’
State secrets privilege). See generally Louis Fisher, The Law: The State Secrets Privilege: From Bush II to Obama, 46 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 173 (outlining the continuation of the abuse of the State secrets privilege from the Bush to Obama administrations).
114 The Supreme Court has heard four major detainee cases. Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). See also Civil Liberties
in
Wartime
Timeline,
ANNENBERG
CLASSROOM,
http://www.annenbergclassroom.org/Files/Documents/Timelines/CivilLibertie
sinWartime.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9ZG-QA23] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015) (de-

tailing major civil rights issues post 9/11, including the Guantanamo detentions).

115 For a longer history of wartime restrictions on civil liberties, see generally
Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War
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in government power threaten core freedoms of our society and
should be temporary measures used only in times of necessity, the
potential for abuse of citizenship-stripping laws becomes even
more salient. With no end in sight to the current threats from AlQaeda and its splinter cell organizations and with the proliferation
of terrorist threats multiplying to include groups like ISIS and the
Khorasan Group,116 the limited duration of wartime that has in
times past cured restrictions of civil liberties remains elusive.
Moreover, an expansion of citizenship-stripping laws now will appear effective, in retrospect, when current hostilities cease and may
be further expanded to combat subsequent threats.
Exigencies of wartime aside, the package of rights afforded by
citizenship does provide tangible benefits absent from other legal
categories. First, it affords a status that is more protectable and
certain than any denominative one. The permanency of citizenship
allows a freedom of movement and livelihood without question of
administrative violations or misunderstanding of the gaps in rights
and protections afforded to permanent residents or illegal aliens.117
Second, citizenship affords rights in the international arena that
cannot be obtained through other means, such as the right to petition a home State for representation at an international court or the
right to bring a case against a nation to a regional international
court mechanism.118 Third, citizenship grants civic rights that are
Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005) (performing a large-scale, quantitative study on
the effects of civil liberties in wartime and finding that they empirically have a
high probability of being curtailed). The article reminds us of Cicero’s maxim inter arma, silent leges (“during war, law is silent”). Id., at 3.
116 Dan Kedmey, Worse Than ISIS? A Primer on the Khorasan Group, TIME (Sept.
23,
2014),
http://time.com/3421701/khorasan-al-qaeda-iraq-isis-syria
[http://perma.cc/TF9Y-7EGJ]; Olga Khazan, Why Africa Is the New Terrorism Hub,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2013/09/why-africa-is-the-new-terrorism-hub/279956
[https://perma.cc/78WJ-RR49].
117 For example, even permanent residents may lose their status and be subject to deportation if they “declare [themselves] a ‘nonimmigrant’ on [a] tax return[]” or “fail to file income tax returns while living outside of the United States
for any period of time.” Maintaining Permanent Residence, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGR.
SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/after-green-cardgranted/maintaining-permanent-residence [https://perma.cc/VT54-PZYY] (last
updated Aug. 29, 2013).
118
Representation would be available for institutions such as the International Court of Justice or European Court of Justice. Contentious Jurisdiction, INT’L
CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index. php?p1=5&p2=1
[https://perma.cc/6WLP-RERL] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Competences of the
Court
of
Justice
of
the
European
Union,
EUR.
PARL.,
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aspirational and that foster a community ethos of equal participation and service. For example, citizens serve jury duty, 119 are eligible to run for office,120 and are eligible to apply for federal government positions.121
Finally, the right to freedom of movement across international
borders, perhaps the main right associated with citizenship and its
iconic symbol of the passport, should not be overlooked. As Mark
Twain once stated, “Travel is fatal to prejudice, bigotry, and narrow-mindedness.”122 Travel allows individuals to expand their
cultural and intellectual ambits, to visit friends or family abroad, to
engage in international business, and to gain a unique perspective
that encourages inclusion rather than isolation. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights codifies the right to movement within
national and international borders under Article 13123 and the European Union guarantees the right under the Schengen Agreement
and the Schengen Convention of 1990.124 In today’s world of crossborder economic investment, job growth, and ease of transportation, this right is even more important than it was in Twain’s time.
A State’s grant of citizenship, then, creates an important and
useful bundle of rights. The valuable nature of the grant comes not
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/
displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.3.10.html [https://perma.cc/8QZV-H2SA] (last updated
Apr. 2014). Other courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, require a
particular type of citizenship (namely, citizenship in an EU country) to bring a
case against a State and have it adjudicated in the international court. Interestingly, these institutions may also not have jurisdiction to hear individual petitions on
a deprivation of nationality claim. See Adam I. Muchmore, Passports and Nationality in International Law, U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 301, 312 n. 26 (2004) (listing
different courts to which one might bring a deprivation of nationality claim and
the relative chances of getting past the jurisdictional stage).
119 Jury Service and Selection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012). This is perhaps
viewed as a requirement rather than a right, but it is nonetheless an important
means of civic participation.
120 U.S. CONST., art. 1, §§ 2–3.
121 Exec. Order No. 11,935, 41 Fed. Reg. 37,301, 37,301 (Sept. 3, 1976).
122 MARK TWAIN, INNOCENTS ABROAD 650 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1996) (1869).
123 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) art. 13, G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (providing that “1) Everyone has
the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state;
2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to
his country”).
124 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 Apr. 2004
(amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68), 2004 O.J. (L 158). See also The International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art. 12, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (codifying similar rights with limitations).
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necessarily from the individual rights included but rather from the
package as a whole and the symbolism of a State’s willingness to
offer its protection and defense to an individual in the Westphalian
nation-State world order.125 Each of the rights granted could be
curtailed individually or could be selectively not applied by States,
as in the case of representation at international legal institutions.
But once the package of rights becomes more valuable than the
sum total of its parts, its revocation merits additional scrutiny.126
4.

MERITS OF CITIZENSHIP-STRIPPING PROVISIONS

4.1. International Legal Limitations
The international legal system does not have strong prescriptions against revocation that causes either statelessness or loss of
dual nationality. Though the former is substantially more serious,
the latter similarly deprives an individual of one set of very valuable rights connected to an additional country.127 Given the fact that
dual nationality until recently was disfavored by the majority of
nations,128 regulation of its grant and revocation are largely left to
States’ prerogatives without the direction or influence of international legal limitations.129 No UN-based treaties regulate dual na125 This is true even in the case of dual citizenship. Citizenship is not unitary—there are not multiple “grades” of it in kind. Having a different set of rules
for dual citizenship, or applying the uniform laws in ways that only target or
reach dual citizens, will erode the value of unitary citizenship as well by undoing
the premise underlying both and either form.
126 There is a large literature on the inherent value of citizenship in forming a
social democratic nation that is not the subject of this article. However, this article
takes as a starting point the inherent value of citizenship as a social and theoretical construct that has value beyond the rights given. For additional reading, see
generally AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL
INEQUALITY (2009); Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship?, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 279
(1995); T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in 2 THE WELFARE STATE READER
30 (Christopher Pierson & Francis G. Castles eds., 2006); Maurice Roche, Citizenship, Social Theory, and Social Change, 16 THEORY & SOCIETY 363 (1987); Bryan S.
Turner, Outline of a Theory of Citizenship, 24 SOCIOLOGY 189 (1990).
127 See infra Section 3 (describing the applicable rights attached to citizenship).
128 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (detailing recent changes to
States’ policies toward dual nationality).
129 See generally Yvonne Schroter & Reinhold S. Jager, Multiple Citizenship in
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tionality. Regional treaties either make no mention of provisions
related to loss of dual nationality130 or explicitly allow for loss of
nationality based on the “voluntary acquisition of another nationality.”131
International law provides greater restraints on loss of nationality that begets statelessness, but caveats related to national security weaken these protections. As the European Convention on
Nationality’s Explanatory Report states, “the obligation to avoid
statelessness has become part of customary law.”132 This formulation of customary international law at best prevents no more than
egregious or repeated arbitrary revocations of nationality. The caveat that stripping, even to the point of statelessness, is lawful for
reasons of security provides States a wide opening to construct
their laws accordingly. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights Article 2 declares, “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”133
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (ICCPR)
freedom of movement clause under Article 12 guarantees the rights
to leave and re-enter one’s “own country.”134 Although the broad
language of Article 12 has been clarified by the General Comment
as applying to nationals, aliens, and “any individual who has special ties to or claims in relation to a given country,” including nationals who have been stripped of their nationality in violation of
international law, the broad understanding of persons to whom the
Article may apply is capped by national security caveats.135 The
Germany, in MULTIPLE CITIZENSHIP AS A CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN NATION-STATES 81
(D. Kalekin-Fishman & P. Pitkanen eds., 2006) (detailing why Germany continues
to have extremely limited allowance for dual nationals as its immigration default);
William Thomas Worster, International Law and the Expulsion of Individuals with
More than One Nationality, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. FOREIGN AFF. 423 (2009) (explaining
that a State’s decision to expel a national is not a violation of international law
provided the individual has an additional nationality).
130 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 20(1), Nov. 21, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 143.
131 European Convention on Nationality, art. 7(1)(a), Nov. 6, 1997, E.T.S. 166
(entered into force Mar. 1, 2000).
132 Explanatory Note to the European Convention on Nationality, ¶ 33 (Nov. 6.
1997), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/166.htm
[https://perma.cc/WW2R-8AR5] (emphasis added) [hereinafter “Explanatory
Report”].
133 UDHR, supra note 123, art. 2.
134 ICCPR, supra note 124, art. 12(2), (4).
135 Human Rights Committee, General Comment on Article 12 of the Cove-
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right to enter one’s own country must not be deprived “arbitrarily,” and the right to leave one’s own country may be subject to restrictions “necessary to protect national security, public order . . .
or the rights and freedoms of others.”136
The two codified legal instruments on the right to nationality,
the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, have similar qualifiers.137 The 1961 Convention states under Article 8 that a
Contracting State “shall not deprive a person of his nationality if
such deprivation would render him stateless” but adds “notwithstanding th[at] provision[] . . . a Contracting State may retain the
right to deprive a person of his nationality, if . . . being grounds existing in its national law at that time . . . the person . . . (ii) Has conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State.”138 The 1954 Convention, under Article 32,
requires Contracting States to “as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of stateless persons”139 but waives all
requirements laid out in the Convention as applied to persons who
“have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity” or who “have been guilty of acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.”140 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the
1951 Convention for the Protection of Refugees, which uses identical language, clarifies the breadth of the latter term.141 “Formal
nant ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, General Comment No. 27 (Nov.
2, 1999).
136 ICCPR, supra note 124, art. 12(2), (4).
137 According to the UNHCR website, these are the “key legal instruments in
the protection of stateless people.” UN Conventions on Statelessness, UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a2535c3d.html [https://perma.cc/9CT8-V7E6]
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
138 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, art. 8(1), (3)(ii), 989 U.N.T.S.
175 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1975). Note that this is the exact language used in
the 1981 British Nationality Act.
139 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 32, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
(entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).
140 Id. art. 1(2)(iii)(a), (c).
141 The Handbook for the 1951 Convention is more comprehensive than the
Handbook for the 1954 Convention, and the explanations that are given for certain
terms in the 1954 Handbook parallel those interpretations from the 1951 Handbook. See UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROTECTION OF STATELESS PERSONS 2 (2014),
available
at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/53b676aa4.html
[https://perma.cc/D9X6-NABY] (superseding the Guidelines on Statelessness
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proof of previous penal prosecution is not required,” and the determination of whether a stateless person falls into one of these categories is made by the “Contracting State in whose territory the
applicant seeks recognition.”142
Regional international law bodies are just as guilty of upholding toothless provisions. The European Convention of Nationality
of 1997 Article 7 provides that States may deprive nationals of their
nationality where statelessness will ensue only in certain cases, including for “conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of
the State Party.”143 The Explanatory Report clarifies that conduct
“seriously prejudicial” is drawn from the 1961 Convention. Such
conduct would not include criminal offences of a general nature,”144 but affirmative examples of prejudicial conduct are not
given. The Explanatory Report further alludes to the power of individual States to make this determination when it declares, under
the requirement for written notification, that “for decisions involving national security, only a minimum amount of information has
to be provided.”145 The American Convention tracks the language
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stipulating under
Article 20(3) that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality . . . .”146
No. 1: The definition of “Stateless Person” in Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons; Guidelines on Statelessness No. 2: Procedures for Determining whether an Individual is a Stateless Person; and Guidelines on Statelessness No. 3: The Status of Stateless Persons at the National Level).
142 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees ¶ 149, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992).
143 European Convention on Nationality, supra note 131, art. 7. Perhaps more
troublesome is the fact that neither France nor the United Kingdom has ratified
the European Convention on Nationality (ECN). Chart of Signature and Ratification
of Treaty 166, European Convention on Nationality, Status as of Dec. 11, 2014, COUNCIL
OF
EUR.,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=166&CM
=&DF=&CL=ENG [https://perma.cc/GSH3-6GK3].
144 Explanatory Report, supra note 132, ¶ 67(1). The only reservation related
to Article 7 is from Austria, which arguably diluted the protection against statelessness even further by stipulating that Austria “declares to retain the right to
deprive a national of its nationality, if such person, being in the service of a foreign State, conducts himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the interests or
the reputation of the Republic of Austria.” List of Declarations Made with Respect to
Treaty No. 166, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/fulllist/-/conventions/treaty/166/declarations?p_auth=tirwvaqR
[https://perma.cc/ZH7D-LPG2] (last updated Dec. 12, 2014).
145 Explanatory Report, supra note 132, ¶ 86.
146 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 130, art. 20(3) (em-
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The European Court of Justice (ECJ)’s Rottman Judgment,147 issued in 2010, illustrates the high level of discretion afforded to nations to determine matters of nationality bordering on statelessness. Rottman, an Austrian, applied for citizenship in Germany
while undergoing legal proceedings on charges of fraud in Austria.
Once Germany granted him citizenship, Austria revoked his Austrian citizenship per standard procedure. Germany, upon learning
of his failure to declare pending charges in Austria, then denied his
naturalization, making him effectively stateless.148
Rottman
brought his case to the ECJ. After affirming that the acts in debate
technically did not violate the European Convention or the Universal Declaration because they were not arbitrary,149 the Court upheld the acts of both States as lawful provided that the German national courts’ determination to withdraw nationality obtained by
deception “observe[d] the principle of proportionality.”150 The
Court’s affirmation that statelessness under certain circumstances
would be upheld as lawful verified the precarious legal protections
for nationality.
In both cases of regional and international treaties, the language of exceptions provides less concern than the general lack of
signatories, which is the real restraint to a robust international consensus on the limits of statelessness. Only twenty countries have
ratified the ECN.151 Fifty-five countries have ratified the 1961 Convention, most only after a “major campaign” launched in 2011 to
mark its fiftieth anniversary.152 Another practical issue in implementation is that non-governmental organizations and international actors tend to focus on larger trends of statelessness related
to mass population deprivations. The NGO and third party
phasis added).
147 Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R I-1467.
148 Id. ¶¶ 22–34.
149 Id. ¶ 60.
150 Id. ¶ 65.
151 Chart of Signature and Ratification of Treaty 166, European Convention on Nationality, Status as of Dec. 11, 2014, supra note 143. Twenty-nine countries have
signed the ECN. Id.
152 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, List of Accession and Ratification,
UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V4&chapter=5&lang=en [https://perma.cc/5NWF-CSAN] (last visited Dec. 15,
2015);
Key
for
Protecting
the
Stateless,
UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a2535c3d.html [https://perma.cc/653Y-9MVD]
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
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movement largely focuses on stateless persons in aggregate, a
group estimated to be at around 10 million,153 such as populations
rendered stateless by border delimitations like the dissolution of
the former Yugoslavia154 or by mass expatriations due to revisions
of citizenship laws like in Burma.155 Need-based organizations target alleviating basic access issues and primarily help to address the
effects of statelessness, rather than attacking the causes.156
Despite the relative shortcomings of the international legal
regime related to citizenship revocation, the existence of two Conventions and myriad protections within regional rights regimes
point to an implicit recognition of the durability of citizenship or a
rebuttable presumption in favor of criminal sanction up to but
never including its revocation. One might think of the international legal regime as a means of constraining the space available to
States to impose blanket revocation policies, instead forcing States
to craft more careful and heightened levels of scrutiny for evoking
such extreme sanctions. This presumption becomes more persuasive in light of the second prong of analysis—arguments related to
wise policy measures. By all accounts, expanding the reach of citizenship-stripping provisions, no matter the result, is a bad policy
decision.
4.2. International Policy Implications
Expansion of citizenship-stripping proposals fractures international cooperation, provides tacit encouragement to States who
153
An
Introduction
to
Statelessness,
UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c155.html [https://perma.cc/V4L7-8GSR]
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
154
See
Who
is
Stateless
and
Where?,
UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c15e.html
[https://perma.cc/K3XCG8MA] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015) (stating that “Montenegro, which was formerly
part of the Yugoslav federation, has approximately 3,200 registered stateless people”).
155
Id. See Situation of Human Tights in Myanmar, Oct. 31, 2014, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/69/L.32, GAOR, 69th Sess. (2014) (calling for increased efforts in “providing access to full citizenship on an equal basis” for religious minorities in Myanmar).
156 Stateless
–
UNHCR
Actions,
UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c16a.html
[https://perma.cc/V8QFCKJQ] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015) (naming the four categories on which the Commission works: Identification, Protection, Prevention and Reduction).
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use citizenship-stripping as a political tool to consolidate power,
normatively sets the international community backwards in its
evolution towards rights promotion and individual empowerment,
and requires implementation of a new and extreme policy where
existing law enforcement tools already exist. This applies whether
the stripping results in loss of dual nationality or in statelessness.
4.2.1. Fractured International Cooperation
Ancient Greece and Rome used banishment, or what we call
citizenship-stripping, as a form of punishment and social control.157
Those societies’ use of banishment led influential thinkers like Immanuel Kant to justify banishment as a natural right of States.158
However, the Greek and Roman versions sent the individual outside the bounds of civilization. Today, ‘banishment’ is akin to
shipping an individual to another State to have it assume responsibility, or to colloquially ‘clean up the mess.’159 If this becomes the
new norm, what happens if all countries want to strip a threatening individual’s citizenship? Whose national law takes priority, if
limitations on statelessness are still a goal to be respected?
4.2.2. Use as a Political Tool
As noted in Part II, countries known for grave human rights
abuses and powerful autocratic governments like Bahrain, Qatar,
and Kuwait now use citizenship-stripping for self-perpetuating
aims.160 If this continues, the delicate balance of States and indiGibney, supra note 96, at 6.
Id.
159 As one op-ed stated, “No country has a right to shift its terrorists to others.” Saul, supra note 14. An interesting theoretical way to consider this in reverse
was also offered. Id. (“Our culture, too, produced these ‘terrorists.’”).
160 Supra Section 2.1.3. See also Patrick Galey & Alice K. Ross, Lords Deal Blow
to Home Office Plans to Make Terror Suspects Stateless, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISM
(Apr.
8,
2014),
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/04/08/lords-deal-blow-to-homeoffice-plans-to-make-terror-suspects-stateless
[https://perma.cc/L3N5-H5AP]
(describing Lord Pannick QC’s opposition to the Immigration Act of 2014 when
he stated that “there are regrettably all too many dictators around the World willing to use the creation of statelessness as a weapon against opponents and we
should do nothing to suggest that such conduct is acceptable”).
157
158
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vidual rights that the international community has worked hard to
achieve will start to erode.161 Once we as a collective take the first
few steps backwards, there is no telling how far the system can
slide and how much long-term damage the current world order
will sustain.
4.2.3. Rejection of Less Disruptive, More Effective Tools
Perhaps most importantly, the decision to advance citizenshipstripping adds an unnecessary tool to an already well-stocked
toolkit. Its usage so far has raised many issues that harm implementing States’ reputations.162 This may be the singular difference
between the use of citizenship-stripping laws during wars for citizens who became members of a foreign State’s armed forces
fighting against their country of nationality and the potential use of
similar provisions for citizens joining non-state actor groups today.
4.2.4. Creation of Inconsistent Laws on Terrorism
First, the determination to revoke citizenship requires a concerted understanding of what types of actions will warrant revocation. If the distinguishing factor is “terrorism,” nations will vary
wildly in their application of policies based on the longstanding
difficulty of agreeing on an internationally-acceptable definition of
the term.163 This differs from other interpretations wherein a term
161 This is already true in the political rhetoric surrounding citizenshipstripping proposals. Many government officials are quick to incorrectly state the
legal standard as a conditional right of citizenship without a clear understanding
of the issue. See Chris Alexander, House Debate, Bill C-24: Strengthening Canadian
Citizenship Act, CAN. PARLIAMENT, http://openparliament.ca/bills/41-2/C-24
[https://perma.cc/373E-7ASP] (“Citizenship has never been inalienable. Canadian citizenship was legislated in the House.”); Charlie Savage, Bill Targets Citizenship
of
Terrorists’
Allies,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
6,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/world/07rights.html?_r=0 (quoting Hillary Clinton as stating “United States citizenship is a privilege . . . [i]t is not a
right.”).
162 See infra Sections 4.2.4-6.
163 See, e.g., Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, ¶ 83
(Feb. 16, 2011) (U.N. Special Trib. for Lebanon, Appeals Chamber) (finding a customary international law crime of terrorism for the first time in a hybrid tribunal).
See generally BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006) (cover-
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has been defined but the limits of the bounded definition itself are
debatable. In the terrorism context, the bounds of action that could
be considered a springboard to revocation are even more undefined, leaving a frightening amount of discretion to domestic
courts.
Second, the determination requires domestic courts like those
in the UK to make highly factualized decisions based on foreign
immigration laws without an appropriate level of training or cultural understanding. Unlike in cases of jurisdictional disputes,
these administrative law issues require courts to decide substantive matters of foreign law that are often subject to a large amount
of executive discretion in the foreign country, making precedent or
explanatory reports difficult to obtain.164
Third, revocation requires courts to interpret the 1954 Convention’s definition of statelessness as applied to persons who may
qualify for citizenship in a country but who for non-legal reasons
will not or have not yet been recognized as citizens by the second
State.165 UK courts have expressed this difference as one between
ing all major attempts to define terrorism since the 1920s). The absence of a singular definition of terrorism has led to the proliferation of act-specific conventions
that are included in the umbrella of terrorism. See Text and Status of the United Nations Conventions on Terrorism, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (Dec. 26, 2013),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml
[https://perma.cc/K83N-ZC6J] (listing act-specific conventions aimed at suppressing, for example, nuclear terrorism, financing terrorism, and terrorist bombings).
164 See Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hold in the Doughnut: Discretion and
Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 703 (1997) (suggesting U.S.
immigration law is in a “crisis of discretion and judicial deference” and would
benefit from greater oversight regarding discretionary agency decisions); Jo Shaw
& Nina Miller, When Legal Worlds Collide: An Exploration of What Happens When EU
Free Movement Law Meets UK Immigration Law, 38 EUR. L. REV. 137 (2013) (concluding that in some fields of EU immigration law there has been a consistent failure
to apply EU principles at the national level, particularly in the UK).
165 This tends to work to the detriment of appellants. In the B2 case in the
UK, appellant won at the SIAC on the argument that Vietnam did not consider
him as a citizen and hence revocation would make him stateless. The Commission analyzed Vietnamese nationality law in principle and in practice and concluded that the legislation was “deliberately ambiguous so as to permit the Executive to make whatever decisions it wished” and because SIAC found that the
Vietnamese government “does not consider [appellant] to be a Vietnamese national,” the revocation order could not proceed. B2 v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, Judgment on Preliminary Issue [2012] SIAC ¶¶ 18–20 (Eng.).
However, the revocation order was upheld at the appeals court on the grounds
that “if . . . it is clear that an individual under the law of a foreign state is a national of that state, then he is not de jure stateless,” which is the qualification that is
relevant for the purposes of determining statelessness under international law. B2
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de jure and de facto statelessness. This parsing of titular distinctions
threatens to expand the ambit of citizenship revocation in cases of
statelessness—the most egregious cases of abuse of States’ power.
It may also generate a confusing split between nations’ interpretations of the 1954 Convention that will need clarification from a
higher legal body. Although similar issues of interpretation exist
in international law, the combination of discriminatory results,
widening of the possibility for statelessness, and higher courts’
deference to domestic decision-making make these cases particularly unsuitable for counter-terrorism policies.
4.2.5. Procedural Fairness Questioned
In addition, the laws create questions of how a State will give
notice of revocation to an individual who is abroad and how the
individual will then have adequate knowledge or resources to
make use of the right to an appeal.166 If an individual has been
stripped of citizenship while in the home country but has not simultaneously been convicted of a crime and does not have a country
to which she may be immediately deported, the host State faces the
difficult and perhaps optically embarrassing position of either indefinitely detaining the person until deportation or letting the perv. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2013] EWCA Civ. 616, ¶ 92 (Eng.).
In this case, the appeals court held that Vietnam’s actions merely rendered the
appellant de facto stateless, which was not a recognized legal status for purposes of
following the mandates of international law. Id. B2’s statelessness was upheld by
the UK Supreme Court in a judgment on Mar. 25, 2015. Pham v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 ¶ 38 (Eng.). In that judgment, the
Court also dismissed B2’s argument that deprivation of any nationality violated
his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. Id at ¶¶ 58–59.
166 There is already evidence that failure to appeal by the statutory deadline
has affected citizens who have been denaturalized under UK’s 2006 Immigration
Act. See Matthew Gibney, ‘A Very Transcendental Power’: Denaturalisation and the
Liberalisation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom, 61 POL. STUD. 637, 650 (2013) (citing Amanda Weston, Deprivation of Citizenship - By Stealth, INST. OF RACE REL. (June
9,
2011),
http://www.irr.org.uk/2011/june/ha000018.html
[https://perma.cc/2TSL-X2YK]) (noting that a number of applicants have missed
their deadlines now that they can be denaturalized before an appeal is heard).
The right to an in-country appeal in the UK has been found to require a guarantee
in legislation, and the 2004 changes to the law have expressly removed such possibility. All citizens revoked of their rights while abroad must pursue appeals
abroad. See G1 v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2012] EWCA Civ.
867, 867 (Eng.) (denying the right to appeal based on the 2004 amendment to the
statute).
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son remain in the country without legal status.167 In the recent case
of M2 in the UK, M2 had his citizenship revoked but was able to
re-enter the country because his passport still had “indefinite leave
to remain” stamped on it, raising serious questions about the enforcement of citizenship-stripping and the efficacy of the practice.168
4.2.6. Lack of Transparency and Potential for Abuse of
Discretion
Finally, the recent rise in citizenship-stripping cases has been
accompanied with a notable lack of transparency both in terms of
the number of cases and exact reasons for the ultimate decisions.169
This lack of transparency is contrary to the goals of criminal justice
and security, as it provides no logical promotion of deterrence or
publicized sense of retribution.170 For example, the British Home
167 This is what the U.S. did in cases of former Nazis found within U.S. territory. See Tom Teicholz, The Pariah Loophole, L.A. TIMES (June 13, 2008),
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/13/opinion/oe-teicholz13
[https://perma.cc/6T4C-MGTH] (describing the situation of six Nazi criminals
who were legally deported but remain in the United States because no country
would accept them). For a recent example of indefinite detention of a defendant
in the B2 case in England, see Sandra Mantu, Citizenship Deprivation in the United
Kingdom, 19 TILBURG L. REV. 163, 169–70 (2014) (describing how B2’s citizenship
revocation order was upheld by the UK Supreme Court, but as his country of
origin, Vietnam, would not immediately recognize his claimed citizenship rights,
he was “placed in legal limbo” as “an alien placed by the UK executive in detention awaiting removal to a country that does not recognize him as one of its nationals and cannot be forced to take him back”).
168 Victoria Parsons & Alice Ross, UK Government Faces Long Legal Battle After
Man Stripped of Citizenship Returns, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/aug/20/uk-government-legalbattle-man-stripped-citizenship-returns [https://perma.cc/NH6F-TMXN].
169 See Chris Woods & Alice K. Ross, ‘Medieval Exile’: The 42 Britons Stripped of
Their Citizenship, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Feb. 26, 2013),
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/
02/26/medieval-exile-the-21britons-stripped-of-their-citizenship [https://perma.cc/QW6U-ZCYM] (noting
that at least eleven people were not given reasons for denials, and that the Bureau
had to do a FOIA request to get the information they compiled). The SIAC is also
allowed to hear evidence in secret under its “closed material procedure” that allows the Home Secretary to present material to the court without disclosing it to
the appellant or his representative. Special Immigration Appeals Commission
Act, 1997, c. 68 § 5(3) (Eng.).
170 Although for cases in the U.S., under Terrazas v. Vance, the revocation cannot be for punitive reasons and is thus technically a civil penalty, its broadcasting
to the public can still in many ways fulfill some of the theories of the criminal
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Office refused to explain the reasons for depriving citizenship in
eleven of the thirteen cases from 2006–2010, and in two of the cases
that had been appealed, the individuals were killed in American
drone attacks in Somalia while waiting for their appeals.171 The
lack of transparency, fueled by the nature of the practice as an executive measure with limited judicial review, leads to great concerns about the potential for abuse of discretion and overuse. In
the United States, the Board of Appellate Review, a quasiindependent judicial body172 responsible for overseeing loss of nationality appeals, was replaced in 2008 with the Bureau of Consular Affairs—an executive agency that now performs “on a discretionary basis an alternative, less cumbersome review.”173 More
recently proposed laws that do not require a criminal conviction
before invoking citizenship-stripping provisions are particularly
alarming.174 The mantra ‘history repeats itself’ blares loud in the
face of sustained Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment.175
punishment system given its severity and practical effects. This also defeats one
possible goal of the program—public shaming. For more on this, see Schuck, supra note 107, at 72.
171 Bennhold, supra note 59; Cobain, supra note 57. The government cited the
“Data Protection Act,” which forbids it from releasing personal data held on individuals without individual consent or with narrowly tailored exceptions that the
government claims would not apply in these cases. Data Protection Act 1998 c. 29
§§ 7(4)–(6) (Eng.); Smith, supra note 14. There was speculation that these occurrences were connected. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
172 22 C.F.R. § 7.8 (1981). The board’s decision could be reviewed in a trial de
novo in federal district court. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (1980). For more on the Board of
Appellate Review (BAR), see Lawrence Abramson, United States Loss of Citizenship
After Terrazas: Decisions of the Board of Appellate Review, 16 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol.
829, 843–44 (1984). The BAR has called citizenship “the most fundamental right of
an American.” In Re BAS, Bd. App. Rev. 12 (Feb. 3, 1983).
173 22 C.F.R. §§7, 50; 73 Fed. Reg. 62196, 62196 (2008).
174 See Case of Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 2011
Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 11 (2011) (detailing circumstances where Mr. Al-Jedda was identified by the Home Secretary as a terrorist threat and subjected to consequences
prior to a conviction); Sangeetha Pillai, Proposals to Strip Citizenship Take Australia a
Step
Further
Than
Most,
CONVERSATION
(May
28,
2015),
http://theconversation.com/proposals-to-strip-citizenship-take-australia-a-stepfurther-than-most-42398 [https://perma.cc/QZR9-EY4U] (detailing a new Australian law where the authority to strip a dual citizen of their citizenship is left to
the discretion of ministerial decisions).
175 Anna Sauerbey, Paris and Europe’s Anti-Refugee Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/opinion/paris-and-europesanti-refugee-backlash.html [https://perma.cc/QHQ2-A95X]; Islamophobia: Understanding
Anti-Muslim
Sentiment
in
the
West,
GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-antimuslim-sentiment-west.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZCJ6-RUM9] (last visited Jan. 15,
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For these reasons, the policy rationales behind citizenship revocation in the national security context fall short.
5.

ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS TO COMBAT THE EXPANSION OF
TERRORISM

There are several less draconian measures that have been explored and which could be further implemented to stem the tide of
FTFs, beyond the plethora of existing crimes in domestic codes under which returning FTFs could be held liable176 and preventive societal programs that could stem the underlying appeal for FTFs to
engage in terrorist training.177 This Part will suggest several possible alternatives and defend their legality.
5.1. Passport Suspension, Revocation, and Temporary Travel
Documents
If the main right in the bundle of citizenship that currently
threatens Western nations is the right of returning FTFs to travel—
both to ISIS-dominated areas and then back to their countries of
origin—restrictions on this right would be the most direct way of
achieving the same pragmatic result as citizenship-stripping with2015).

176 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–39 (2012) (listing and criminalizing terrorist
acts, such as the use weapons of mass destruction and financial support for terrorists under the chapter entitled “Terrorism”). Some countries are already using
their terror laws to charge citizens with recruitment. See Austria: 13 Are Accused of
Recruiting
Militants,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
29,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/29/world/europe/austria-13-are-accusedof-recruiting-militants.html [https://perma.cc/C7XC-LTKN] (detailing the arrest
of thirteen individuals in Austria suspected of recruiting fighters for radical
groups); Four Charged in Finland’s First Terror Case, YLE UUTISET, Sept. 17, 2014,
http://yle.fi/uutiset/four_charged_in_finlands_first_terror_case/7475726
[https://perma.cc/C5QW -578W] (Fin.) (reporting that in Finland’s first terrorism
trial, one of the four defendant’s charged is facing recruiting charges).
177 See, e.g., HOME OFFICE, COUNTER-EXTREMISM STRATEGY, 2015, Cm. 9148, 17–
19
(U.K.),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government
/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148
_Accessible.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ2Z-GWBN] (outlining a strategy to understand the causes of extremism involving building more cohesive communities and
partnering with other groups working to oppose extremism).
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out the severe costs. Absent a blanket travel ban to certain areas of
the world,178 there are three individualized means of restricting
freedom of movement. These are passport suspension, passport
revocation, and the issuance of temporary travel identification
documents.179
Encouragingly, many of the same countries that implemented citizenship-stripping have signaled moves towards policies of
passport revocation, perhaps recognizing it as a more humane,
large-scale, and temporary measure. Canada180 and the United
States181 have used some form of limitations on passports in the
178 Although travel bans for citizens of other countries entering the U.S. are
legal under the Constitution’s common defense clause, U.S. citizens have a right
of return and right of free movement. These rights may only be restricted with an
administrative notice and opportunity to comment; hence, they may not be applied in a blanket fashion. This was decided in Bauer v. Acheson, where the DC
appeals court struck down the government’s argument that a passport was a political document at the complete discretion of the Executive. 106 F. Supp. 445, 44950 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Australia’s new counter-terrorism law employs this presumption of illegality for travel to “declared areas” in which “a listed terrorist organization is engaging in a hostile activity in that area of a foreign country.” CounterTerrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (Cth) ss 119.2–.3
(Austl.). However, this provision may violate basic rights, including the UDHR’s
Article 13 (Right to freedom of movement) and the ICCPR’s Article 12 (same).
UDHR, supra note 123, art. 13; ICCPR, supra note 124, art. 12. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has upheld the Executive’s authority to restrict travel to countries
or continents as a blanket restriction during World War II, it remains unclear
whether or not such broad restrictions would be upheld as against non-state actors rather than a country with which the U.S. has declared war. See Zemel v.
Rusk, 85 S. Ct. 1271, 1277 (1965) (explaining that travel to all of Europe was prohibited in 1939, travel to Yugoslavia was restricted in the late 1940s, and travel to
Albania, Bulgaria, Communist China, Rumania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union was restricted in 1952).
179 Under §215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, it is unlawful
to enter the U.S. without a valid passport, which demonstrates the significance of
these restrictions on freedom of movement. Pub. L. No. 82–414, § 215, 66 Stat. 163,
190 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1994)).
180 Jesse Tahirali, Ottawa Revoking Passports of Canadians Who Join Extremists,
CTV NEWS (Can.) (Sept. 20, 2014), http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/ottawarevoking-passports-of-canadians-who-join-extremist
-groups-alexander-1.2017048 [https://perma.cc/JHN9-5WRE].
181 See generally Ramzi Kassem, Passport Revocation As Proxy Denaturalization:
Examining the Yemen Cases, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2099 (2014). Ted Cruz’s citizenship-stripping bill also included a provision to revoke passports. See Expatriate
Terrorists Act, S. 2779, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014) (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act to include provisions on loss of nationality if a citizen becomes a
member of or assists a designated foreign terrorist organization). A third way
would be for the U.S. not to touch nationality at all as a counter-terrorism tool,
avoiding both citizenship and passport revocation. At least in the cases of FTFs,
this seems to be the case. See Susan Jones, State Dept. Has Not Cancelled Passports of
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fight against terrorism or FTFs. On February 12, 2015, the UK
passed a new Counter-Terrorism and Security Act that gives the
government powers to seize and retain passports and temporarily
exclude individuals from the UK for up to two years.182 Although
these measures also fall under rebuke for their constriction of civil
liberties and relative absence of due process, they have been legally
available and incorporated as levers into foreign and domestic policy since well before the new terrorist threats. I will describe how
these policies may be used in a lawful manner and why they are
advantageous from a policy perspective.
Contrary to the evolving norm against citizenship-stripping,
restrictions on passport issuance have been consistently used in the
U.S. legal system as measures to restrain travel when individuals
do not comply with laws or regulations.183 Under current U.S. law,
a passport may be revoked if the individual is legally required to
be imprisoned or is on parole or other supervised release after having been imprisoned as a result of a conviction for drug law felonies and certain misdemeanors.184 Freedom of movement may also
Any ‘ISIS or Foreign Fighters’ Returning to U.S., CNSNEWS (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-jones/state-dept-has-not-cancelledpassports-any-isis-or-foreign
-fighters [https://perma.cc/Y57D-MHTX] (explaining that the no-fly list is one
such tool that avoids citizenship and passport revocation). However, this particular threat remains in its infancy, and the possibility of more concerted action on
the part of the U.S. government remains possible.
182 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, 2015, c. 6, s 1, sch 1 (Eng.). It remains
to be seen whether these new provisions will supplant or add to existing citizenship-stripping measures.
183 The UK and Canada have done similarly as well. In the UK, passport issuance is a Royal prerogative and is not regulated by legislation. Passports may
be revoked when a person’s continued possession of one would be “contrary to
the public interest.” See HM PASSPORT OFFICE, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE: PASSPORT
ENTITLEMENT
(Jan.
13,
2012)
(U.K.),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/118554/royal-prerogative.pdf [https://perma.cc/NE8E-7DML]
(highlighting the role that the discretion of the Home Secretary plays in passport
issuance). The Home Secretary redefined public interest in April 2013 in a Written
Ministerial Statement to make the provision particularly applicable to “individuals who seek to engage in fighting, extremist activity or terrorist training outside
the United Kingdom, and then return to the UK . . . .” Passports, Written Ministerial Statements, 25 Apr. 2013, Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (2014) 69WS (U.K.). For
Canada’s policy, which is very similar to the U.S. policy, see Canadian Passport
Order, SI/81-86 (Can.).
184 22 U.S.C. §2714 (2012). See also 22 C.F.R. § 51.65 (2009) (detailing the process for notifying an individual of denial or revocation of a passport); 22 C.F.R. §§
51.60–62 (2009) (explaining what the Department of State should consider when
denying and restricting the issuance of passports).
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be restricted through other statutory provisions: if the individual
has obtained a passport through fraudulent or illegal means,185 if
the individual owes an amount greater than US $2,500 in child
support,186 or if the individual has been convicted of sex tourism,187
to name a few.188 The Department of State through Executive Order No. 11295 has been empowered to prescribe additional rules
governing passport verification and issuance.189 To the extent that
the government can justify passport revocation for FTFs under
similar reasoning—to prevent an individual from evading the law
or engaging in crimes related to international travel—additional
grounds for passport revocation should not raise any new constitutional concerns.
With respect to FTF regulation in particular, the Passport Act
of 1926 and its subsequent amendments allow the Department of
State to deny and revoke passports for the protection of national
security and foreign policy interests.190 This right was affirmed in
8 U.S.C. § 1504 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 652(k)(1) (1996). Under a 2005 amendment to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), any person
who owes child support in an amount greater than $2,500 will be denied a U.S.
passport until the matter is cleared up. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-171, § 7303, 12 Stat. 4, 145 (2005).
187 22 U.S.C. § 212(a) (2012).
188 State courts have the authority to order a parent, possessing a child’s
passport, to surrender the passport to the court or the court’s designee. 22 C.F.R.
§ 51.28(b) (2007); Fact Sheet on Passports for Family Law Judges and Lawyers, U.S.
DEP’T
OF
ST.
–
BUREAU
CONSULAR
AFF.,
https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/passports/information/legalmatters/family-law.html [https://perma.cc/7YDA-E9H7] (last updated Feb.,
2008). In 2012 and 2015, legislation was introduced in the House and Senate proposing to revoke passports of citizens who had serious “tax delinquencies” that
amount to more than $50,000. Fixing Americas Surface Transportation (FAST)
Act, H.R. 22, 1st Cong. § 32,101 (2015); Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st
Century (MAP-21) Act, S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 40,304 (2012) (including the provision).
189 Exec. Order No. 11,295, 31 Fed. Reg. 10,603, 10,603 (1966). See also Policy
Memorandum: Procedures for Recommending Revocation of a U.S. Passport to
the Department of State, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, PM-602-0036
(Apr. 15, 2011) (describing the Department of State’s power to revoke passports
and appropriate ways for USCIS field officers to report suspicious passport activity).
190 22 U.S.C. §211(a) (2012) (“The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries
by diplomatic representatives of the United States . . . under such rules as the
President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States . . .
.”). This was affirmed in Haig v. Agee. 453 U.S. 280, 289–91, 308 (1981). However,
because the right to travel is a part of citizens’ liberty interest under the Four185
186
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the 1981 Supreme Court case Haig v. Agee, which also made clear
that the Secretary of State has the power to deny a passport for reasons not specified in the federal statutes and that the power of revocation is encompassed in the power of denial more generally.191
Secretary of State John Kerry, in a House Foreign Affairs Committee session, has expressed his prerogative to make greater use of
passport suspension regulations against FTFs. He asserted that his
“authority to revoke passports” would be examined as a possible
means of preventing FTFs from returning home when the preferred and traditional model of law enforcement and arrest proved
inadequate.192 Reflecting the growing awareness of this power,
Representative Poe has introduced the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Passport Revocation Act to require the Secretary of State
not to issue passports to any individual whom the Secretary has
determined is a member or who is aiding and abetting a designated FTO.193
Patrick Weil, in a 2014 Comment in the Yale Law Journal, argues that U.S. passport revocation violates the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees of the Privileges and Immunities Clause194
because it eliminates a citizen’s right to be “recognized, in foreign
countries, as an American citizen.”195 Weil finds this right in the
words of an 1835 case Urtetiqui v. D’Arcy, which construed identification as the second primary function of the passport, alongside its
function as a request that its bearer may pass safely and freely
teenth Amendment, it may not be deprived without due process of law. See Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (stating that the discretion of the Secretary cannot be exercised to avoid this due process requirement).
191 Haig, 453 U.S. at 301–04.
192 The ISIS Threat: Weighing the Obama Administration’s Response: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Foreign Aff., 113th Cong. 16 (2014) (statement of John Kerry,
Sec. of State).
193 H.R. 237, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015–2016). This bill has passed the House and
was received by the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on
July 22, 2015. H.R. 237 – FTO Passport Revocation Act of 2015, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/237
[https://perma.cc/9ZV6-BN7A ] (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
194 U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2(1) (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
195 Patrick Weil, Citizenship, Passports, and the Legal Identity of Americans: Edward Snowden and Others Have a Case in the Courts, 123 YALE L.J. F. 565, 569 (2014),
available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/citizenship-passports-andthe-legal-identity-of-americans [https://perma.cc/JZ89-VK8L] (quoting Urtetiqui
v. D’Arcy, 34 U.S. 692, 699 (1835)).
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abroad.196
Yet he has little authority to suggest why the right to a legal
identity abroad could not be curtailed within the bounds of due
process, as is the right to international travel.197 The historical
moment at which the Urtetiqui case was decided suggests that the
legal identity protected by a passport was not a federally issued
identification of citizenship but rather a heterogeneous smorgasbord of identification cards with mixed levels of recognition.198 Exactly what the right to identity means199 remains an unanswered
question. And while the passport revocation debate is in vogue
with regard to FTFs, previously applied statutes allowing for revocation had no territorial limit. Their possible application abroad
has not triggered any judicial petitions. Without a better understanding of the manifestation of the right to a legal identity in practice, it is difficult to articulate how deprivation of this right harms
an individual.
Even granting an acceptable articulation of the harm, Weil is
too quick to dismiss alternative forms of identification and consular records.200 There is no universal standard of sufficient identification of nationality. International customary law and municipal
laws do not recognize the passport as the conclusive proof of naUrtetiqui, 34 U.S. at 699.
Weil, supra note 195, at 570–71 (citing to the development of citizenship as
a right not to be easily revoked, rather than citing the evolution of the doctrine of
the passport as a source of legal identity).
198 Passports were issued by individual states and municipalities through
1856, when the federal government asserted its exclusive right to issue passports.
See JOHN C. TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP
AND THE STATE 95 (2000) (“The issuance of passports . . . by state and local authorities before 1856 reflects the accuracy of the holding that, during the antebellum
period, the central government of the United States had ‘only a token administrative presence in most of the nation and [its] sovereignty was interpreted by the
central administration as contingent on the consent of the individual states.’” (citation omitted)).
199 This is harder to understand in the context of an 1835 case because until
May 27, 1941, it was not illegal for a U.S. citizen to leave the country without a
passport. DANIEL C. TURACK, THE PASSPORT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1974). The
practical lack of enforcement of citizens carrying passports for identity purposes
indicates that the issue of identity did not arise with any frequency or gravity. For
a more current history of passports and their use in international law, see Muchmore, supra note 118, at 319–21 (agreeing that the Urtetiqui case itself seems too
outdated to remain relevant given the change in the federal passport regime).
200 Weil mentions in passing that “other identity documents such as driver’s
licenses and birth certificates are not necessarily available or recognized abroad.”
Weil, supra note 195, at 576.
196
197
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tionality.201 Passports are one form of identification; but others can
substitute for passports,202 just as passports that are legally valid
documents for travel purposes and would qualify as “passports”
under the U.S. definition of the term may be insufficient to identify
nationality.203 Countries like the United States issue certain documents that are valid for limited or no travel purposes, but which
are only issued on confirmation of one’s citizenship—it is unclear
why those documents could not be used abroad to show proof of
201 TURACK, supra note 199, at 231. According to Turack, in many countries, a
passport is prima facie or rebuttable proof of citizenship but not conclusive. Id. at
231 nn. 49–50.
202 For example, the U.S. will recognize many alternative documents if one
loses a passport and needs proof of citizenship for purposes of obtaining a new
passport for travel. See U.S. Dept. of State, Application for a U.S. Passport, DS-11, 2
(Sept. 2013), available at http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/ passports/first-time.html [https://perma.cc/CK23-GB8V] (listing a U.S. birth certificate and naturalization certificate as primary evidence of U.S. citizenship and early public records, a state-issued Letter of No Record, or a Form DS-10 Birth
Affidavit as secondary evidence of citizenship). The primary documents accepted
for proof of citizenship may be even stronger forms of identification because they
are protected with more procedural process than passports. See Kassem, supra
note 181, at 2105, 2105 nn. 40, 43 (noting that certificates of naturalization and citizenship cannot be revoked without a pre-deprivation hearing, while a passport
may be revoked merely with a written notification and directions for seeking any
applicable post-revocation review). The U.S. government, for internal benefits
that require proof of citizenship, will also accept non-passport forms of identity.
See, e.g., Proof of U.S. Citizenship and Identity for Medicaid, VA. DEPT. OF SOC. SERVICES
(Jan.
2011),
www.dss.virginia.gov/.../proof_of_citizenship __01-25-11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DCH4-7BNT] (listing documents for proof of citizenship in-

cluding an official military record of service, an insurance record, and evidence
of civil services employment by the U.S. government).

§101(a)(30) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 defines a
“passport” to be any travel document issued by a competent authority showing
the bearer’s origin, identity and nationality, if any, which is valid for the entry of
the bearer into a foreign country. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub.
L. No. 82-414 § 101(a)(30), 66 Stat. 163, 267 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1481 (2012)). Passports that qualify under that definition have been issued by
non-state entities, such as the Free City of Danzig, the Order of Malta, and the Holy See and the Vatican. TURACK, supra note 199, at 207–13. Similarly, the World
Citizen Passport has been developed by Gary Davis as an experiment in reducing
statelessness; since its invention in 1948 over 2.5 million passports have been issued, and it has been accepted in several nations. See Margalit Fox, Garry Davis,
Man of No Nation Who Saw One World of No War, Dies at 91, N.Y. TIMES (July 28,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/us/garry-davis-man-of-no-nationdies-at-91.html [https://perma.cc/K3NK-D4JF] (summarizing the life’s work of
Garry Davis, who invented the idea of a world passport and justified its legal validity under Article 13 of the UDHR); The World Passport, WORLD GOV’T OF WORLD
CITIZENS, http://www.worldservice.org/docpass.html [https://perma.cc/8CXUEB5Y] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (providing information on the World Passport).
203
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nationality.204 Finally, if documents that are acceptable by a country of origin to substitute for a passport as proof of citizenship are
insufficient in a foreign country, any underlying rights that would
need to be vindicated by the U.S. government would still be guaranteed. Presumably an individual would need to contact a U.S.
embassy or consulate to obtain non-travel-related rights concurrent
with citizenship. As written notification is necessary for revocation
of a passport, the paper trail could be prima facie evidence of nationality available to an individual.205
Passport restrictions are not only legal, they are policypreferred. Restrictions have flexibility in their application not
available with the permanent and rudimentary denial of all rights
by citizenship-stripping. The government may choose to permanently revoke a passport or temporarily suspend a passport for a
limited period of time in light of fears of terrorist training in Iraq
and Syria.206 The government may then issue limited emergency
travel documents for authorization to travel either only to a country of origin in the event that a passport is suspended while the individual is abroad207 or a limited validity travel document for trav204 For example, the U.S. issues U.S. Passport Cards that verify citizenship,
which are only good for land travel to/from the U.S. and cannot be used for international travel by air. U.S. Passport Card, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFF., http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/passports/
information/card.html [https://perma.cc/U4BA-GB6F] (last visited Dec. 15,
2015). States also now issue enhanced drivers licenses (EDLs), which provide
proof of identity and U.S. citizenship but are not available for international travel
by air. Enhanced Drivers Licenses: What Are They?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/enhanced-drivers-licenses-what-are-they
[https://perma.cc/98R6-ELYS] (last updated Nov. 6, 2014).
205 22 C.F.R § 51.65(a) (2009).
206 Britain will suspend passports for up to two years. See David Cameron,
Prime Minister of the UK, Speech at the Australian Parliament (Nov. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter “Cameron Speech”] (stating that the soon-to-be-introduced CounterTerrorism Bill will include new powers to seize passports). Britain also has plans
to issue temporary exclusion orders for up to thirty days, preventing entry into
the country of citizens and requiring them to submit to an interview with police
upon arrival in the UK. Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (c. 6) §§ 2–4
(Eng.).
207 See, e.g., Emergency Travel, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/traveldocuments/emergency-travel [https://perma.cc/2VSP-MDPK] (last updated Oct.
16, 2014) (describing the nature of the emergency travel document); Application for
a United Kingdom Emergency Travel Document, U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/375913/ETD _Application_Form.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ6B-SAXG] (last
updated Nov. 11, 2014) (reviewing the emergency travel protocols in the United
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el with geographic limitations for emergency or humanitarian exceptions.208 In all of these situations, the law restricts freedom of
movement because the actions the individual will take once in the
foreign country, or the mere act of going to the foreign country,
would be in violation of U.S. law and grounds for prosecution.
Passport revocation is also policy-preferred because it promotes the same aims as citizenship revocation with a more limited,
less restrictive approach. Particularly in the case of FTFs, the targeted terrorists would be lower level, recently radicalized individuals, particularly youth,209 whose surveillance is most critical for
intelligence purposes to understand the larger threats of ISIS.
Passport suspension would allow for a gathering of intelligence, a
temporary halt to freedom of movement, and possible prosecution
for supporting terrorism, without the indefinite and unknown consequences of total banishment. This is a solution for a different
type of terrorist threat than those terrorists who pose an imminent
and direct threat to a nation’s security, which is a comparatively
limited group of individuals on lists for targeted killings.210
Limitations on freedom of movement are only advantageous
if used with appropriate discretion, transparency, and procedural
Kingdom).
208 22 U.S.C. § 2714(d) (2012) (“Emergency and humanitarian exceptions”);
Request for Limited-Validity Travel Document in Special Circumstances under Urgent,
Compelling
and
Compassionate
Considerations,
PASSPORT
CAN.,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/passport/security/limited-validity.asp
[https://perma.cc/FF53-5QHM] (last updated June 7, 2013).
209 See, e.g., GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM, “FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS”
(FTF) INITIATIVE: THE HAGUE – MARRAKECH MEMORANDUM ON GOOD PRACTICES FOR A
MORE EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO THE FTF PHENOMENON 1, (2014), available at
https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/140201/14Sept19_The+
HagueMarrakech+FTF+Memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SAT-K7ZL] (endorsing
the effects of individualized mentoring programs in providing “counternarratives” that support youth otherwise at risk of radicalization).
210 Although the two groups could overlap, citizenship-stripping is not coterminous with targeted killing, and the two measures serve different but not mutually exclusive purposes. In any event of a serious, imminent threat, with the
proper international and national legal authorization, individuals threatened with
passport revocation could also be subject to targeted killing. However, the total
number of individuals who are lawfully targeted for unmanned aerial attacks,
while classified, is only a small percentage of the number of people surveilled and
alleged to have engaged in terrorist-related actions. The individuals targeted
must meet certain criteria to be considered a threat substantial enough to warrant
targeting. See Cora Currier, Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes,
PROPUBLICA (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-weknow-so-far-about-drone-strikes [https://perma.cc/BN9F-QEGC] (describing the
process for selecting individuals for targeted killing).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss4/4

2016]

Expatriation as Counter-Terrorism Tool

1321

due process guarantees. For example, Britain has recently added
to its counter-terrorism law the offense of “glorif[ying]” terrorism
through speech or online posting.211 As the Passport Act now
makes clear following a 1991 amendment, in the United States,
First Amendment protections on free speech may not be repealed
as grounds for denying or revoking a passport.212 Any potential
passport suspension regulations that would threaten individuals’
protected First Amendment rights would be impermissible.213
Britain’s new measure allows for suspension for up to two years,
recognizing exigencies of wartime and the need to evaluate changes to the world order in the short term, given the situation’s volatility.214 The length of time warranted for passport suspension remains debatable. Nevertheless, the idea that in most cases the
appropriate course of action will be temporary rather than an ultimate revocation is an important recognition of the non-punitive
nature of passport limitations215 and one that distinguishes this
administrative measure from the permanent revocation of citizenship.
Similarly, the lack of transparency present in citizenshipstripping cases thus far appears to have infected the policy of
passport suspension. Canadian officials have revoked passports in
“multiple cases” but will not say how many or based on what objective criteria beyond the “public interest.”216 U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has advocated that suspension be
Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11 §§ 1(3), 2(4), 3(8) (Eng.).
See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub.
L. No. 102-138, § 113, 105 Stat. 647, 655 (1991) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012))
(“A passport may not be denied issuance, revoked, restricted, or otherwise limited
because of any speech, activity, belief, affiliation, or membership [which] would
be protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”).
213 See, e.g., Jillian C. York, The Internet is Not the Enemy, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct.
22, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/22/the-internet-is-not-the-enemy
[https://perma.cc/4MZC-2RYN] (quoting leaders of China and Iraq in their attempts to restrict IS’s use of the Internet and to broadly evoke censorship policies
at the expense of free speech).
214 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015, c. 2, § 4(3) (Eng.).
215 For the current regulations on passport suspension or revocation, once the
harm is alleviated (payment to the government, service of a sentence, etc.), the
passport can be re-issued.
216 Stewart Bell, Canadian Government Begins Invalidating Passports of Citizens
Who Have Left to Join Extremist Groups, NAT’L POST (Sept. 20, 2014),
http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/09/20/canadian-government-revokingpassports-of-citizens-trying-to-join-extremist-groups
[https://perma.cc/R4W5JQPE] (Can.).
211
212
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used on a “case-by-case basis” in order to evaluate its potential effectiveness alongside other options.217 The veil of secrecy that continues to shroud these counter-terror measures upsets sensibilities
on appropriate levels of due process. Just as the Office of Legal
Counsel released its internal memos detailing the objective criteria
for determining the legality of a drone attack on a U.S. citizen,218
the same collective policy for passport revocation should be publicly announced and debated so that it becomes an accepted, known
part of criminal justice enforcement in counter-terrorism cases.
The perception of arbitrariness that both citizenship-stripping and
passport revocation policies have fostered detracts from the policies’ effectiveness and acceptance.
Passport suspension must also not be used for illegitimate
purposes. In Yemen, commentators have written on the revocations of hundreds of naturalized Yemenis’ passports on the alleged
basis of fraudulent applications or minor discrepancies in forms.219
Similar events have occurred in Pakistan.220 Several of the Yemeni
cases, once challenged in U.S. federal court, were resolved in favor
of the individuals, who were returned their passports and allowed
to travel immediately.221 The program’s lack of transparency to the
public paled in comparison to the lack of forthrightness with the
individuals affected, many of whom did not know their procedural
rights to challenge the determinations.222 In order to successfully
David Martosko, Senator Blocks Ted Cruz Bill to Seize Passports from ISIS
Fighters Who Return to the US, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2761333/Swords-cross-Capitol
-Hill-senator-blocks-bill-stripping-citizenship-American-foreign-fighters-aid-ISISterror-army.html [https://perma.cc/5UTG-LEJM] (U.K.).
218 Al-Aulaqi Memorandum, supra note 109.
219 Kassem, supra note 181.
220 See Leti Volpp, Citizenship Undone, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2579, 2579 (2007)
(detailing the placement of a family on the no-fly list because of listing the “wrong
person” on their passports for the emergency contact); Glenn Greenwald, Banished
U.S. Citizens Mysteriously Permitted to Return Home (Maybe), UNCLAIMED TERRITORY
(Sept. 13, 2006), http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/09/banished-uscitizens-mysteriously.html [https://perma.cc/7AP4-DJV7] (criticizing the Bush
administration’s decision to “unilaterally decree[] a secret punishment that could
not be seen, read, understood or meaningfully challenged”).
221 For three such examples of cases which were then withdrawn by the
plaintiff, see Mousa v. United States of America et al., No. 3:13-cv-05958-BHS
(W.D.W.A. filed Nov. 1, 2013); Qassem v. Holder et al., No. 6:13-cv-06041
(W.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 30, 2013); Alarir et al. v. Holder et al., No. 1:12-cv-07781
(S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 18, 2012).
222 Per Haig v. Agee, a restriction on the liberty to travel must conform with
the provisions of the Fifth Amendment. Due Process in these cases guarantees a
217
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advocate for the continued use of passport suspension in place of
citizenship-stripping measures, such actions should not be repeated. Used with appropriate restraint, transparency, and discretion,
passport revocation could be a consequential alternative to citizenship-stripping.
5.2. Secondary Alternatives: Rehabilitation Programs, Increased
Border Security, and Civil Aviation Liability
Many of the following proposed practices are being implemented and strengthened at the time of this writing. States’ serious consideration of alternative policies should be applauded, but
they should also be encouraged to supplant rather than supplement citizenship-stripping laws.
Terrorist rehabilitation is an idea unique to the post 9/11 alQaida and its affiliate organizations’ threats.223 Saudi Arabia has
the most extensive rehabilitation program, which it has been developing since 2004.224 Despite contentious reporting on high recidivism rates,225 both Saudi and American officials have called the
program a success, and, at the encouragement of the United States,
it has become a model for the future Yemeni rehabilitation centers.226 Other Muslim countries worried about radicalization, instatement of reasons and an opportunity for a prompt post-revocation hearing.
Haig v. Agee, 435 U.S. 280, 309 (1981). Even with successful challenges, the information explaining an individual’s release was “Kafkaesque.” Volpp, supra
note 220, at 2586.
223 See John Horgan & Kurt Braddock, Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges
in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs, 22 TERRORISM & POLITICAL
VIOLENCE 267, 268 (2010) (conducting a one year study of de-radicalization programs in Northern Ireland, Colombia, and Saudi Arabia to assess their effectiveness).
224 Benjamin Barthe, Saudi Correctional Centre Claims Success with Goremer Jihadists,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
27,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/27/mohammed-bin-nayefcentre-rehabilitation-jihadists [https://perma.cc/3C8B-8FPX].
225 Jessica Stern, Mind Over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists,
FOREIGN AFF. (Jan. 2010), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65896/jessicastern/mind-over-martyr [https://perma.cc/R42D-PKMN].
226 Marisa Porges, The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/radicalization-and-extremism/saudideradicalization-experiment/p21292 [https://perma.cc/WC4N-3UR3]. See also
John Horgan & Mary Beth Altier, The Future of Terrorist De-Radicalization Programs,
13 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 83, 84 (2012) (suggesting that, despite the potential for recidivism, “ultimately, disengaged terrorists themselves may be the most potent force
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cluding Egypt, Algeria, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, now
have similar programs,227 and European countries faced with large
numbers of FTFs for the first time are following suit.228 While the
U.S. has not embraced rehabilitation for domestic jihadists, branches of the Department of State provide support to international efforts to expand these programs.229
Rehabilitation programs provide means of addressing the underlying causal harms that create FTFs. In conjunction with traditional prison programs, they are a supplementary approach to
counterterrorism strategies that target recidivism. They directly
oppose one of the main criticisms of citizenship-stripping—that
countries foist their dirty laundry on others by ridding themselves
of any association with the alleged terrorist—instead seeking to
promote values of inclusion and re-acceptance of the individual into the political community of the State. In so doing, programs may
be contrived with nation-specific conceptions of what types of educational and vocational courses to offer, or they may be designed
regionally and still support the underlying goals of increased inin pre-empting engagement among prospective recruits”).
227 Horgan & Altier, supra note 226, at 85–86.
See generally TERRORIST
REHABILITATION AND COUNTER-RADICALISATION (Rohan Gunaratna et al. eds., 2011)
(analyzing examples of such programs in a number of these and other states).
228 See Elisabeth Braw, Inside Denmark’s Radical Jihadist Rehabilitation Programme, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/denmark-offersreturning-jihadis-chance-repent-277622 [https://perma.cc/L896-N8X7] (highlighting examples in Denmark and Scandinavia).
229 Part of the exit strategy in Iraq involved the establishment of educational
and moderate faith-based programming in the criminal system, though the program remains voluntary for prisoners. See Sara Wood, Iraq Detention Operations
Focus on Education, Rehabilitation, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. NEWS (Oct. 10, 2007),
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx
[https://perma.cc/R8RCMZCA] (discussing the educational programing undergone in Iraq). See generally
AMI ANGELL & ROHAN GUNARATNA, TERRORIST REHABILITATION: THE U.S.
EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ (2011) (overviewing the various types of programming utilized by the U.S. in Iraq). Since 2009 the Department of State has funded a longterm program called “Countering Violent Extremism” (CVE), which works with
groups such as the UN’s Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and
the International Center for Counterterrorism, a Dutch NGO, to “strengthen the
capabilities of key countries to rehabilitate and reintegrate [violent] offenders.”
BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
TERRORISM 2013 250 (2014). CVE supports the use of the Rome Memorandum on
Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, a set of best practices to facilitate growth in rehab programs. GLOBAL
COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM, Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation
and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (2014), available at
https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/38330/Rome+MemorandumEnglish [https://perma.cc/2ZPW-RUBJ].
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ternational partnership as stated in UN Resolution 2178, the UN’s
best collective response to ISIS to date.230
Resolution 2178 further recommended “intensify[ing] and accelerat[ing] the exchange of operational information regarding actions or movement of terrorists”231 and “prevent[ing] the entry into
or transit through their territories [of travelers] for the purpose of
participating in [terrorist acts].”232 The UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) has already begun this work by
organizing a European conference on the matter and spearheading
a working group related to “detecting suspicious travel movements: tools for analysis and identification.”233 The CTC could go
further by organizing a special meeting in the likes of the five special meetings it held from 2003 to 2007 under the mandate of Resolution 1373, which preceded 2178 on the issue of the cross-border
movement of terrorists.234
Increased information sharing can facilitate border apprehen230 S.C. Res. 2178, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2178 (Sept. 24, 2014) (calling for
Member States to develop and implement “rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters”). The UN in its latest resolution condemning ISIS attacks again calls upon member States to “redouble and coordinate
their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL”
and urges member states to “continue to fully implement the above-mentioned
resolutions” (including Resolution 2178). S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 11, ¶¶ 4–5.
See also S.C. Res. 2195, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2195 (2014) (calling upon Member States to “strengthen border management to effectively prevent the movement
of terrorists and terrorist groups” and stressing “the need to work collectively to
prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations”).
231 S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 230, ¶ 3.
232 Id. ¶ 8.
233 Member States, International Experts Pledge to Strengthen Response to FTF
Threat,
SEC.
COUNCIL
COUNTER-TERRORISM
COMM.,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/news/2014-11-27_eu_commission_swiss_
confederation.html [https://perma.cc/TC3H-XH3Z] (last updated Nov. 28, 2014).
234 S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); Cooperation with
International, Regional and Subregional Organizations, SEC. COUNCIL COUNTERTERRORISM
COMM.,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/cooperation.html
[https://perma.cc/EDK7-JX3K] (last updated Feb. 2, 2011). The fifth and last of
the planned conferences was in 2007, on the exact issue of “Prevention of Terrorist
Movement and Effective Border Security.” Fifth Special Meeting of the CounterTerrorism Committee with International, Regional and Subregional Organizations, “Prevention of Terrorist Movement and Effective Border Security,” SEC. COUNCIL COUNTERTERRORISM COMM.,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2007nairobi/docs.html [https://perma.cc/SX26-H7LS] (last updated 2007). The papers and presentations given for that conference may be of use to States today,
particularly the International Civil Aviation Organization’s presentation and paper regarding its Machine Readable Travel Document program to standardize
passport and visa readers at border controls. Id.
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sion, mitigate the harms that encourage citizenship-stripping, such
as radicalized training in wartime areas of Syria and Iraq, and return to a country of origin. Particular focus should be placed on
heightening standards of border security in Northern Africa235 and
Turkey.236 Turkey might explore expanding its bilateral agreements with European countries to promote information sharing
along the lines of a recently announced agreement with Britain,237
increasing security measures at seaward ports of entry, 238 and expanding checkpoint operations along its borders with Syria and
Iraq.239 Border security enhancement is not a new or radical idea
specific to counter-terrorism, but it is a foundational concern that
235 Border security regimes in North Africa are still in their infancy. See Morocco Hosts North Africa Border Security Conference, NTD (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.ntd.tv/en/news/world/middle-east-/-africa/20131115/83311morocco-hosts-north-africa-border-security-conference.html
[https://perma.cc/94W8-KYBT] (describing a regional conference conducted to
improve border security in North Africa); Danica M. Sirmans, NPS Helps Northern
Africa Improve Border Security Through a Series of Workshops, NAVAL POSTGRAD.
SCHOOL,
http://www.nps.edu/About/News/NPS-Helps-Northern-AfricaImprove-Border-Security-Through-Series-of-Workshops.html
[https://perma.cc/76JJ-LQXP] (last updated Mar. 13, 2014) (outlining regional
efforts to exchange intelligence information and threat warnings).
236 Turkey has come under fire for having a porous border and not making
sufficient efforts to stop the flow of FTFs. See Turkey’s Border Security Problem, ALMONITOR,
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals
/2014/11/turkeyborder-security-problem.html [https://perma.cc/7Y6L-YK7Y] (last visited Dec.
15, 2015) (outlining the border security plan as it existed in 2014 and highlighting
gaps).
237 Britain, Turkey Work ‘Closely’ to Stop Foreign Fighters Flow, H URRIYET
DAILY NEWS (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/britain-

turkey-work-closely-to-stop-foreign-fighters-flow.aspx [https://perma.cc/R79R44GP]. Turkey also has an agreement with Frontex from 2012 that could be further specified. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
AGENCY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL COOPERATION AT THE EXTERNAL
BORDERS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY (May 28, 2012), available at

http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Partners/Third_countries/WA_with_Turkey.
pdf [https://perma.cc/VRG4-4TQW] (agreeing to exchange strategic intel and

border control best practices, thereby promoting practical cooperation among
Frontex and Turkish authorities).
238 See Interpol: Would-Be ISIL Fighters Taking Turkey-Bound Cruises to Join ISIL,
BGN NEWS (Nov. 7, 2014), http://national.bgnnews.com/interpol-would-be-isilfighters-taking-turkey-bound-cruises-to-join-isil
-haberi/1378 [https://perma.cc/4BJV-9XMS] (identifying a pattern of ISIL recruits utilizing cruises to travel to Syria and Iraq in order to avoid airport monitoring).
239 Turkey’s Border Security Problem, supra note 236 (noting that the Border Security Law only requires Turkey to secure a border of 3/8 of a mile, a relatively
narrow boundary).
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should not be overlooked in the discussion of more targeted means
of FTF reduction.
Airlines may be asked to play a greater role in prevention
and detection. With the recent announcement of the cancellation
of subsidized terrorism insurance in the U.S., at least, airlines may
have greater motivation to cooperate for fear of an uninsurable attack.240 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
(IRTPA) of 2004 requires all airline carriers on transatlantic flights
to provide detailed passenger lists to be screened against government no-fly lists.241 Australia newly introduced the same requirement in its Foreign Fighters Bill,242 and Britain may soon propose
similar legislation.243 The European Council, after years of debate,244 passed an agreement to mandate European countries regulate transfer of Passenger Name Record data from airlines to national authorities at the close of 2015.245 The rest of the world,
including Asia, Turkey, and Africa, currently has no such requirement.246 Improving information transfer between airline carriers
240 Jonathan Weisman, Congressional Roadblock Upends Market for Terrorism Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/
business/a-bill-on-terrorism-insurance-is-stopped-by-a-senators-objection.html
[http://perma.cc/6RUU-78QH].
241 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458 § 4011, 118 Stat. 3638, 3712–19 (2004). These requirements were implemented by the Secure Flight Program. 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540, 1544, 1560 (2008).
242 Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 (Cth) s
6, pt 1, div 1(12) (Austl.).
243 Cameron Speech, supra note 206.
244 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Use of Passenger Name Record Data for the Prevention, Detection, Investigation and
Prosecution of Terrorist Offences and Serious Crime, at 6, COM (2011) 32 final (Feb. 2,
2011); Passenger Name Record: EU Reaches Agreement, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35010807 [https://perma.cc/P4MU38RD].
245 Regulating the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data, COUNCIL OF THE
EUR.
UNION,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-againstterrorism/passenger-name-record [https://perma.cc/T5E3-JBU3] (last accessed
Jan. 15, 2015). The text will be revised by “lawyer-linguists” and formally adopted in 2016, after which countries will have two years to implement the provisions.
Id. As with all options in the fight against terrorism, this policy will need to be
carefully monitored for potential intrusions on civil liberties and adequate public
transparency. For a more recent update, see James Kanter, Europe, in Wake of Attacks, Votes to Collect Air Passenger Data, N.Y. TIMES (April 14, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/business/international/eu-collect-airpassenger-data.html [https://perma.cc/DD4Y-T2QW].
246 Alan Travis, European Counter-Terror Plan Involves Blanket Collection of Passengers’ Data, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2015/jan/28/european-commission-blanket-collection-passenger-data
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and government security officials integrate public and private actors involved in the transport of foreign terrorist fighters and
standardize law enforcement practices across the world, further
decreasing the need for citizenship-stripping.
6.

CONCLUSION: ON THE PROHIBITION OF EXPENDABLE IDENTITY

There was a time in the history of the world order when
people were another commodity of nation-states—disposable, expendable, and without basic rights. But the world order of the
twenty-first century strikes a balance between individuals’ rights
and States’ rights. I have shown that the discretion of revoking citizenship has been at all times philosophically conceived of as a
power of last resort and has in practice been narrowed in its application and legal availability since World War II in several Western
nations, the United States taking the strictest position in protecting
the rights of the citizen. I have also shown how the current Western counter-terrorism laws that have emerged as a response to
post-9/11 forms of terrorism threaten to upend this world order. If
lawmakers have not viewed their proposals with an eye towards
historical trends, these new revocation laws seem innovative and
firm in their stance towards banishment. But viewed in the light of
history, the current focus on revocation seems anachronistic and
medieval as a form of punishment. In reply, I have advocated for
the primary tool already available and legally acceptable to combat
terror threats: passport suspension, passport revocation, and temporary travel documents. There remain several other legally available alternative means that could be further explored, such as rehabilitation centers, increased border security, and existing
national criminal law—the mainstay of holding individuals accountable for violations of law.
Sparing use of citizenship-stripping cannot be the mainstay
of a counter-terrorism strategy, and its continued use, even rarely,
maintains its acceptability. Nations must be convinced that there is
no need or utility to augment draconian citizenship-stripping
[https://perma.cc/6KQU-H4UW]; Michael McCaul, Op-Ed., Europe Has a Jihadi
Superhighway
Problem,
TIME
(Nov.
11,
2014),
http://homeland.house.gov/news/mccaul-op-ed-europe-has-jihadisuperhighway-problem-time [https://perma.cc/96U7-8PFA].
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measures in conjunction with myriad other counter-terrorism tools
outlined in this paper. This is particularly true in today’s globalized world, where threats are directed not at nations but at versions of societies that are present nearly everywhere and the relationship between a State and its citizenry at times seems to take
backstage to a more unified, global solidarity. It is time for an affirmative rejection of citizenship-stripping, once and for all.
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